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TRANSCRIPT

Who Gets In? The Quest for Diversity After
Grutter
THE

2004 JAMES MCCORMICK MITCHELL LECTURE
UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO LAW SCHOOL
THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

ATHENA D. MUTUA-MODERATOR
SHELDON ZEDECK,

FRANKH. Wu,
CHARLES E. DAYE,
MARGARET E. MONTOYA,
DAVID L. CHAMBERS-PANELISTS

INTRODUCTION

Athena D. Mutua
On March 8, 2004, the University at Buffalo Law School
hosted its annual Mitchell Lecture,1 a panel discussion entitled, "Who Gets In? The Quest for Diversity After Grutter."

1. Lavinia A. Mitchell endowed the Mitchell Lecture Series in 1950 with a
gift in memory of her husband, James McCormick Mitchell, an 1897 graduate of

the UB Law School.
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The Mitchell Committee2 decided to focus this year's lecture
on innovative proposals to ensure diversity in law school
admissions in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Grutter
v. Bollinger,3 which confirmed that race and ethnicity could
be taken into consideration in admission decisions for diversity purposes. Noting that much of the debate about
Grutter thus far has emphasized the decision's constitutionality or its implications for affirmative action, the Committee sought to have a different kind of conversation, one
that explored new approaches to admissions that might aid
law schools in admitting more diverse student bodies. To
this end, the Committee invited five leading scholars, whose
work, either analytical or empirical, could change or deepen
understandings about the potential for and the obstacles to
diversity in law school admissions post-Grutter. Their short
presentations (each speaker had only twelve minutes to
speak), which provoked a lively discussion, are presented in
this edited transcript of the event together with selected excerpts from the question and answer period.
A. Snapshot of the Grutter Decision
The Grutter case involved the issue of whether
Michigan Law School's use of race as a factor in student
admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and related federal statutes. The
suit was brought against the Law School in 1996, by
Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.61
grade-point average ("GPA") and a 161 score on the Law
School Admission Test ("LSAT"), after she was denied admission.4 She alleged that5 the school "discriminated against
her on the basis of race,"
and that the school "used race as
a predominant factor." 6 Further, she claimed that the Law
School "had no compelling interest to justify [its] use of race
2. The. Mitchell Committee included David Engel and Lynn Mather as CoChairs, Robert Berger, Ilene Fleischmann, Terrence McCormack, Athena
Mutua, and James Wooten.
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. Id. at 316.
5. Id. at 317 (alleging that her denial violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
6. Id. She claimed that doing so gave "applicants who belong to certain
minority groups 'a significantly greater chance of admission than students with
similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.'" Id.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2712835
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in ... admissions,"7 anticipating the Supreme Court's equal
protection analysis applying strict scrutiny to race cases,
thereby requiring the state to demonstrate both a compelling state interest and a narrowly tailored use of racial classifications to further that compelling interest.
The Supreme Court held in a split five-to-four decision
that Michigan Law School has "a8 compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body," and that the School's
"narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to
further the compelling state interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body" is
not prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause or the other
claimed statutory provisions. 9 Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion on behalf of the Court.
The crux of the case, though buried in the rationale,
was the Court's finding that race is a relevant difference in
the context of a university's educational mission of bringing
together students of diverse ideas, backgrounds, and experiences. Context matters, said the Court, and strict scrutiny
requires that relevant differences be taken into account. 10 In
explaining the function of a racial classification in achieving
a diverse student body, the Court noted that, ''just as
growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experience is likely to affect an individual's views,
so too is one's own, unique, experience of being a racial
minority in a society like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters."11 Further, the use of race is narrowly
tailored in an admissions program, like Michigan's, where
every applicant receives individual review, each is deemed
qualified, all factors of diversity are considered, and race is
used as a "plus factor," but not a defining feature of the
application. Finally, the Court expressed the hope that in

7. Id.
8. Id. at 329.
9. Id. at 343.
10. Id. at 327 (noting that "context matters in reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause," and that strict scrutiny analysis must take relevant differences into account). See also id. at 341
(stating that race-conscious admissions be narrowly-tailored and that strict
scrutiny is not abandoned when relevant differences are taken into account).
11. Id. at 333 (noting that the need for a critical mass of minority students
is not based on belief that minority students always express some characteristic
minority viewpoint on any issue; rather, the policy goal is to diminish stereotypes something that cannot be done with token numbers).
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twenty-five years race-conscious admissions would no
longer be necessary.
B. A Glimpse at the Panelists and their Presentations
1. Panelists. 12 Nils Olsen, Dean of the University at
Buffalo Law School, opened the Mitchell Lecture with welcoming remarks. He was followed by Lynn Mather, CoChair of the Mitchell Committee, who explained the way in
which the Committee came to host a panel discussion on
diversity in admissions and introduced the panelists in the
order in which they spoke.
Professor Sheldon Zedeck began the discussion with a
presentation of the research work in which he is engaged
with Professor Marjorie Shultz of Boalt Hall School of Law
with funding from the Law School Admission Council. The
project identifies factors and criteria for successful lawyering and developing and validating tests that can be used as
complements to the LSAT for admitting law schools.
Professor Zedeck, a Professor of Psychology at the University of California at Berkley since 1969, was the only
social scientist on the panel. He has been involved in numerous efforts to create, evaluate and ensure that job entry
tests relate to the actual requirements of a particular job's
performance. He has co-authored four books and written
numerous articles on the topics of moderator variable, selection and validation, test fairness, banding performance
appraisal assessment centers, stress and work, and family
issues. He has served on the editorial boards of the Journal
of Applied Psychology, Contemporary Psychology, and
Industrial Relations and was editor of the Human
Performance, a journal he co-founded in 1988. Professor
Zedeck has also been very active in the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology and has been a
consultant to a wide variety of public and private sector or-

12. These biographical descriptions are summaries taken from the Mitchell
Lecture announcement brochure, republished as a press release. See Press
Release, University at Buffalo Law School, Advancing Law School Diversity to
Be Focus of Panel Discussion: Participants to Include Leading Scholars,
Experts Involved in Supreme Court Case (Feb. 19, 2004), at http://www.buffalo.
edu/news/fast-execute.cgi/article-page.html?article=65910009 (last visited May
25, 2004).
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ganizations particularly in the area of test development as
they relate to job entry and performance.
The second speaker, Professor Frank H. Wu, is a Professor of Law at Howard University and an Adjunct Professor at Columbia University. He testified as an expert
witness in the Grutter case, and has written extensively on
issues of race, justice, and the law. In 2002, he published
the book entitled, Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black
and White, 13 which won the "Notable Book" Kiriyama Prize.
He also has co-authored the book Race, Rights and
Reparation: Law and the Japanese American Internment. 14
Since the Lecture, Professor Wu has been named dean of
Wayne State University Law School.
Professor Charles E. Daye, the Henry Brandies Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
spoke next. He was the first African-American to join the
UNC faculty as a tenure-track professor in 1972. Professor
Daye was a past president of the Law School Admission
Council ("LSAC") and made significant contributions to
major LSAC reports on affirmative action, diversity, and
test use in law school admissions. He served as dean of the
North Carolina Central University School of Law for four
years before returning to the UNC-Chapel Hill law faculty.
He has taught and published on a variety of issues including, inter alia, housing and community development, torts,
law school admissions, and black lawyers.
Professor Margaret E. Montoya, the fourth speaker, is a
Professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law.
She and her students also filed an amicus curiae brief in
Grutter, arguing that New Mexico's urgent need to provide
legal services to underserved populations is a compelling
state interest justifying considerations of race in law school
admissions. She was also a witness for the student defendant-interveners in the case. Professor Montoya has
published extensively in the area of critical race theory and
is a past president of the Society of American Law Teachers, a present member of its board of governors, chair of the
Diversity Committee for the Law and Society Association
13. Frank H. Wu, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE
(2002).
14. Eric Yamamoto, Margaret Chon, Carol L. Izumi, Frank H. Wu & Jerry
Kang, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT (2001).
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and currently serves as the interim director of the Southwest Hispanic Research Institute.
Professor David L. Chambers, the last panelist, is a
longtime supporter of diversity in admissions at Michigan
Law School. He is the Wade H. McCree, Jr., Collegiate Professor Emeritus at the University of Michigan Law School
and has been a member of the Michigan law faculty for 34
years. Professor Chambers co-authored a comprehensive
study of the careers of white and minority graduates of the
Michigan Law School entitled, "Minority Law Graduates in
Practice," which earned the Distinguished Article award
from the Law and Sociology section of the American Sociological Association. Professor Chambers served as a co-chair
of the Association of American Law Schools' ("AALS") Task
Force on Diversity in Admissions, is past president of the
Society of American Law Teachers, and served on the AALS
executive committee. He is known for his work on the legal
profession and family law.
2. Presentations. The presentations focus on three
major themes or concerns that pervade discussions about
affirmative action and are given voice in the Supreme
Court's Grutter decision. These themes are diversity, merit,
and social justice, including questions of who should bear
the cost of systemic subordination, reflecting both current
and historically-based oppression. In the law school
admissions context these themes become more specific discussions about the meaning of diversity, the place, history,
and usefulness of tests, grade point averages as indicators
of merit, and the relationship of merit and diversity to the
systemic subordination and historical exclusion of certain
groups manifested, in part, in the small pool of minority law
school applicants.
While each of the presentations takes up these themes,
they do not simply rehash the affirmative action debate but
explore the underlying assumptions of the quest for diversity in admissions and propose new tools to achieve it.
The Mitchell Committee believed that Professors
Zedeck and Shultz's empirical study would provide a
distinctive starting point for the discussion it envisioned,
and the panel therefore began with an overview of this
work. The Zedeck-Shultz research project aims to identify
factors and criteria for successful lawyering and to develop
and validate tests that can be used in addition to the LSAT
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for admitting law students. This project is of particular
relevance to the question of diversity because preliminary
information suggests that the work may yield law school
admission tests that will produce a far more diverse pool of
qualified students than is currently culled by law schools'
reliance on LSAT and college GPA scores. In this sense the
research marries diversity and merit, redefining merit in a
way that includes diversity. It does so, however, by asking a
com:gletely different question: What makes an effective lawyer? 5
What makes an effective lawyer, indeed? During the
first stage of their research, Professors Zedeck and Shultz
have identified twenty-six factors that contribute to effective lawyering. Professor Zedeck explains several of these
factors and notes that these factors will serve as a basis for
developing and validating a test in the second stage of the
research.
Professor Wu's presentation addresses the reasoning in
the Grutter case by critiquing what he terms as the Court's
abstract notion of diversity. He cautions that diversity,
when divorced from the social and historical experiences of
particular groups in American society, could be manipulated easily to avoid addressing the issues of Native American, African-American and Latina/o American exclusion.
Instead, he explains this abstract view of diversity could be
met through the admission of more Asian American or
black African students 16to the exclusion of other historically
disadvantaged groups. He asks us always to pose
the
question: "Diversity for what purpose and for whom?" 17
Professor Daye describes the preliminary work and
motivations for an empirical study he and others have undertaken to explore the connection between race and educational diversity. Grutter endorses the proposition that racial
diversity contributes to educational diversity. Professor
Daye agrees with this proposition, positing that his "life
would have been different had he been white" and arguing,
as do many proponents of diversity, that racial diversity is
crucial to "assure diversity of perspective, experience, expectations, and values." 18 However, opponents to diversity
15.
16.
17.
18.

See
See
See
See

discus.sion infra
discussion infra
discussion infra
discussion infra

pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.

542-50.
552-54.
576-87.
554-62.
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in admissions argue that race is irrelevant. Neither assertion is based in any real empirical evidence; evidence
Professor Daye's research may begin to provide thereby better informing this debate. 19
Professor Daye notes that he is engaging in this
research under protest. He believes that the 20Supreme Court
has forced us to focus on the "wrong issue." The issue, as
he sees it, consistent with Professor Wu's comments, is one
of social justice. Critiquing Grutter and the line of cases
that support it, Professor Daye notes that almost all avenues for dealing with the current effects of past discrimination and historical exclusion in the context of higher
education have been prohibited by the Court, and that the
issues of social or redistributive justice are completely off
the table. 21
The last two panelists' presentations situate the issue
of diversity in admissions in the wider context of education
by shifting the discussion from the underlying assumptions
of admissions to considerations of who gets to apply to law
school, particularly from minority communities, and what
happens to those who apply and are admitted after they enter law school.
Professor Montoya's presentation deals with the issue
of the pipeline to law school in the context of New Mexico,
one of the three minority-majority states, including California and Hawaii. She notes that the pool of potential law
school applicants in New Mexico is quite small and this has
an effect on law school efforts to admit diverse student
bodies. The small applicant pool results in part from the
vagaries of race and the "multiple histories of exclusion and
discrimination," and the ways in which these play out in
inferior schooling and high minority dropout rates in22 kindergarten through twelfth grade ("K-12") and college. For

19. See discussion infra pp. 560-62.
20. See discussion infra pp. 556-58.
21. See discussion infra p. 557.
22. See discussion infra pp. 564-70. Professor Montoya began by noting that
the question of "Who gets in?" is innocent enough, but behind it are "multiple
histories of exclusion and discrimination. She went on to say that, "race
continues to structure individual relations and institutional arrangements." See
discussion infra p. 564. After providing some demographic information about
New Mexico, she noted that the state "shows patterns of segregation," even
though New Mexico has one of "the most equitable funding schemes for education." See discussion infra p. 566. She concluded this section of her presentation
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example, she explains that there exist approximately 1300
Latina/o seventh graders in New Mexico, of whom, based on
current numbers, only slightly more than half will complete
high school and less than one-hundred in total will complete college and pursue doctorate level work at the Ph.D,
M.D., or J.D. level. 23 Professor Montoya then describes programs in which she has been involved to retain minority
students in K-12, and advocates for law faculty and students to get involved in similar efforts.
In the final presentation, Professor Chambers, like
Professor Montoya, discusses the pipeline to law school, but
also details the last stages of the pipeline-law school
grades, graduation, bar passage, and job placementputting the question of "Who gets in?" in a longer
timeframe. 24 He cautions that, in light of the Grutter
decision, law schools could become complacent
in addressing the problems in this longer timeline. 25 He notes that
minority students, particularly at the large majority white
law schools, do not do as well as white students in terms of
grades, graduation, bar passage rates, and job placement. 26
He believes that these problems together with the pre-law
school pipeline are the issues with which the larger society
must deal iflaw schools are to be in a reasonable position in
twenty-five years, as Justice O'Connor hopes, to eliminate
race-conscious programs.
Together these presentations provoked a lively discussion, excerpts of which are included following the presentations. I then add comments about the event in the Afterword.
WELCOMING COMMENTS

Dean R. Nils Olsen, University at Buffalo Law School
Good afternoon. On behalf of the faculty of the Law
School, I would like to welcome you to our annual James
McCormick Mitchell Lecture. The Mitchell lecture series
by stating that New Mexico represents a context in which educational attainment is affected by race and ethnicity. See discussion infra p. 567.
23. See discussion infra p. 567.
24. See discussion infra pp. 568-69, 571-573.
25. See discussion infra p. 575.
26. See discussion infra pp. 574-75.
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was endowed in 1950 by Lavinia A. Mitchell in memory of
her husband, James. The first Mitchell lecture was delivered by Justice Robert H. Jackson and was ·entitled,
"Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law." It is just as
timely today as it was when he gave it. The lecture was
published as a lead article in the first issue of the Buffalo
Law Review. Through the years, the Mitchell Lecture has
featured an array of distinguished and compelling speakers,
and today's lecture is certainly no exception.
The topic, "Who Gets In? The Quest for Diversity After
Grutter," is particularly timely and important. It is no accident that it was a law school-the University of Michigan
Law School-that was the defendant in the most important
diversity case in twenty-five years in the United States
Supreme Court. Attorneys are, in the classical sense of the
term, the archetypal professional. The services that attorneys provide are often indispensable to all in society, rich
and poor, men and women, minority and non-minority.
Attorneys who operate within the justice system safeguard
its integrity and protect the perceived validity of legal processes that resolve disputes fairly in our society. Given the
increasing diversity of our people, a system in which the
judges and attorneys are not representative of the totality
of American society is likely to undermine over time the
broader community's confidence and support of the system.
In addition, the primary responsibility of attorneys in the
legislative process, in the administrative state, and in corporate governance gives further imperative to a broadbased profession with diverse life experiences, values, and
perspectives.
Nor should we be blind to the history of the legal profession in this country. For more than a century, the
profession was largely comprised of white, Anglo-Saxon
males. Women, ethnic immigrants, and people of color were
consciously excluded and/or marginalized in the legal profession by law, regulation, and custom. Over time, options
for entry into the profession through clerking in law offices
have been effectively eliminated in most states. Attendance
at and graduation from an accredited law school, most often
embedded within the larger university, has become the only
avenue into the profession. As a result, since the role of the
law school is that of a gatekeeper for entry into the profession and since there are effectively no other ways for the
profession to become more representative of society as a
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whole, law schools have, for quite some time, put a particular emphasis upon recruitment, retention, and graduation of what the University of Michigan Law School referred
to as "a critical mass of minority students." In actively
seeking diversity, legal educators have emphasized that the
presence and participation of a representative student body
enriches the learning experiences and opportunities for all
students ensuring that our graduates will be prepared to
live and work effectively in an increasingly diverse society.
Law schools are accredited by the American Bar Association Section on Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar and by the Association of American Law Schools
("AALS"). Both explicitly require demonstrable efforts to
achieve a diverse student body. Thus, Standard 211 of the
ABA standards for the approval of law schools, provides in
important part that "[c]onsistent with sound legal education policy and the Standards, the law school shall demonstrate, or have carried out and maintained, by concrete
action, a commitment to providing full opportunities for the
study of law and entry into the profession by qualified
members of groups, notably racial and ethnic minorities,
which have been victims of discrimination in various forms.
This commitment typically includes a special concern for
determining the potential of these applicants through the
admission process, special recruitment efforts, and a program that assists in meeting7 the unusual financial needs of
many of these students .... " And Section 6-3 of the AALS
Bylaws provides that "[a] member school shall seek to have
a faculty, staff, and student body which are diverse with
respect to race, color, and sex."28
These requirements have had significant success. In
2003, the American Bar Association and the Law School
Admissions Council reported that minority students comprised more than twenty percent of the total J.D. enrollment during the 2002-2003 academic year. 29 The
27. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
AND INTERPRETATIONS Standard 211 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/standards/chapter2.html (last visited May 25, 2004).
28. BYLAWS OF THE AsSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, INC. § 6-3(c)
(2004), available at http://www.aals.org/bylaws.html (last visited May 25, 2004).
29. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION & LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL,
OFFICIAL GUIDE TO AHA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 828 app. A (2005 ed.); see also
Memorandum from David Rosenlieb, Data Specialist, Section of Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar, to Deans of AHA-approved Law Schools,
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importance of a strong commitment to diversity by our law
schools has been demonstrated by the experiences of the
University of Texas Law School after the Hopwood decision30 effectively banned diversity recruitment and of the
University of California Law Schools that have operated
under similar constraints. Resegregation of the. student
body was both dramatic and immediate. Gains that took
decades to achieve and consolidate were set back significantly. Because of the importance of diversity within both
the law school and the legal profession and considering the
persistent attacks that the concept evokes, I am particularly looking forward to today's discussion.
OPENING PRESENTATIONS

Sheldon Zedeck
This afternoon I would like to describe a project that
Marjorie Shultz (Boalt School of Law, University of California at Berkeley) and I have been working on for several
years along with Jamie Clark (graduate student research
assistant). As you may know, the citizens of California
passed Proposition 209 in 1996,31 which states that you
cannot use race or gender for hiring or admissions decisions
at state institutions. After passage of Proposition 209, Boalt
School of Law began looking at how to maintain diversity in
the student body while also assuring merit and complying
with Proposition 209. Marjorie Shultz and I decided to
examine current law school admissions practices including
the Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT") to determine how
good those practices are at predicting success. We wanted to
know whether we could make the system better and at the
same time obtain a more diverse student body.

Corrected Fall 2002 Enrollment Statistics 2 (May 16, 2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/Fall%202002%20Enrollment.pdf (last
visited May 26, 2004).
30. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996).
31. CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 31.
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This afternoon, I am going to describe our project very
briefly. 32 It is funded by the Law School Admission Council
("LSAC"), and we began the first of two phases of the research in July 2001. The ultimate goal is to develop admissions practices that are more valid than current ones, which
rely very heavily on an index of LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point average ("UGPA"). We are interested
in identifying what could be used in addition to the LSAT
and index scores to admit the most qualified students to
law schools. We are asking whether a battery of tests that
complements the LSAT could predict success in practice as
well as in law school. We designed the first research phase
to determine "how we know an effective attorney when we
see one." Once we defined the dimensions of effectiveness,
we needed to determine how they could be measured. We
have spent two years studying this issue, and I am going to
present some of our results this afternoon.
We are now in the second phase, which is designed to
see if predictors other than the LSAT and index can explain
lawyering effectiveness. In Phase I, we attained a reasonable understanding of what makes an attorney effective; we
are now hypothesizing what types of information we can
collect from undergraduates that might predict their success in practicing law. Next, we plan to test our hypotheses
about predictors, initially by administering tests (that will
later be used with undergraduates) to current Boalt students and alums. We will then collect performance
measures on our sample. Once those steps are completed,
we can evaluate whether the tests we have identified and
developed show a statistical relationship to measures of
effective performance in law practice and in law school as
measured by methods other than grades.
In their admissions process, law schools look at an index that combines the LSAT with the undergraduate grade
point average. Research shows that the index correlates
with 33first-year law school grade point average to the tune of
0.49. Statistical correlations go from zero to one, where
0.49 represents a fairly good level of prediction. Another
32. The full report is found in Marjorie Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Phase I
Final Report: Identification and Development of Predictors for Successful
Lawyering (June 30, 2003) (on file with the authors).
33. Lisa C. Anthony et al., Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National
Summary of the 1995-1996 Correlation Studies (LSAC Technical Rep. 97-01,
1999).

544

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

way to look at correlations is to examine the amount of
variance in performance that the test or predictor explains.
A correlation of 0.49 indicates that approximately 25 percent of the variability in first year grade point average for
law school students is explained by the index score. That
leaves 75 percent still to be explained. That 75 percent is
the po:r;tion that we are looking at in our study. We are
interested in increasing the amount of variance in law
school grades that is explained by admissions predictors. In
addition, we want to assess how well the current index and
the complementary tests that we are evaluating explain job
performance of practicing lawyers. The LSAC, who funded
this project, is not the only organization trying to figure out
other ways of selecting students into universities. Medical
school admissions, graduate school admissions, as well as
undergraduate admissions, are all looking for measures besides the MCAT (Medical College Admissions Test), the
GRE (Graduate Record Exam), and the SAT (Scholastic
Aptitude Test), to seek
better explanation of performance
within those contexts. 34
As I mentioned above, the purpose of the first phase of
our study is to identify dimensions of effectiveness both for
law students and for practicing attorneys. In evaluating law
students' performance, we are not interested solely in
grades. We are curious about other criteria that can measure success or effectiveness as a law student. We believe
that non-grade measures of law students' performance may
have similarity to the measures we are developing of the effectiveness of practicing attorneys. Our sample is confined
to Boalt Hall students and alumni, which is Berkeley's Law
School. Right now, we lack the capability to do more than
study Boalt Hall. If we are successful at Boalt, then our
model and strategy, and perhaps our findings, might be extended to other institutions.
During the first phase, we interviewed second and third
year Boalt students, faculty, and alumni from different
parts of the country. The alumni graduated from two to
twenty years ago, and they come from various types of firms
and types of practice. We also involved judges who are asso-

34. Symposium, Complementary Tests for Admissions to Academic
Institutions: Beyond Cognitive Ability, Soc'y FOR INDUS. AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCHOL. (Apr. 2004).
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ciated with or graduated from Boalt Hall as well as clients
of attorneys from Boalt Hall.
We looked at different types of law jobs, taking into account that lawyers work in a variety of practice specialties,
settings, and roles. We know that lawyering varies as a
function of the particular practice. So in the first phase, we
conducted a large number of interviews and focus group
meetings with attorneys from many fields and types of
practice. We asked them all, "How do you know a good attorney when you see one?" We asked them, "If you needed
an attorney, think of whom you might pick, and then tell us
not who, but why?" "What is it about that attorney that
would cause you to pick him or her to represent you in a
particular case?" Through these questions and resulting
discussions, we identified twenty-six effectiveness factors.
In other words, we concluded that there are twenty-six
ways to evaluate the effectiveness of attorneys. That does
not mean that every single attorney would be evaluated on
all twenty-six factors. We expect that there will be varying
sub-sets of factors that are important depending on the type
or field of practice, the number of years out of school, the
setting, etc.
For the purpose of today's presentation, we have
grouped these twenty-six effectiveness factors into eight
categories. The first category is "intellectual and cognitive,"
which includes factors such as "analysis and reasoning" and
"practical judgment." In other words, during our discussions
with Boalt alums, faculty, students, clients, and judges, we
were told that an effective attorney is one who is very good
at analysis and reasoning, shows some creativity, can
problem solve, and also has practical judgment. A second
general factor is "research and information gathering,"
which deals with effectiveness in researching the law, fact
finding, questioning, and interviewing. The third factor, we
label "communications." This includes influencing and advocating, writing, speaking, and listening. The fourth is
"planning and organizing," which covers whether the attorney is good at strategic planning, can manage his or her
own work, and can manage others' work, either staff or colleagues. The fifth is broadly labeled "conflict resolution,"
and whether the attorney is good at negotiations and is able
to see the world through the eyes of others. The sixth is
"client and business relations--entrepreneurship," which
involves networking and providing advice and counsel. The
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seventh broad category is "working with others," developing
relationships within the legal profession, and evaluating,·
developing, and mentoring other attorneys. This factor is to
a significant degree a function of stage of career, type of
firm, and so forth. The eighth category is probably the one
that is most interesting to me as a psychologist; it is concerned with "character," and includes passion and engagement, diligence, integrity and honesty, stress management,
community involvement, and self-development. By integrity
and honesty, we are not concerned so much with traditional
measures of honesty, such as whether an individual will
steal bubble gum from the local candy store, but more with
moral and social responsibility.
After we identified the twenty-six effectiveness factors,
we next developed over seven hundred examples of behaviors relevant to those factors. The participants in our interviews and focus groups generated these behavioral examples of different levels of performance on the twenty-six
effectiveness factors. So, for example, we have examples of
behavior that represents very good "analysis and reasoning." We have examples of behavior that represents moderate levels of "analysis and reasoning." Summarizing the
overall process, then, for each of the twenty-six factors, we
have behavioral examples that were generated by interviews and focus groups, and then evaluated by over two
thousand alumni respondents to a questionnaire that asked
them to evaluate the levels of effectiveness of the different
behaviors for attorneys performing different jobs. Those
evaluated behaviors (statistical results for the evaluations
of the levels of effectiveness) can then be used to assemble a
set of performance evaluation scales that will be used in
Phase II to evaluate attorney performance.
In Phase II of the project, we have hypothesized tests or
predictors that might predict one or more of the effectiveness factors identified in Phase I. This afternoon I am going
to briefly describe some of the tests that we are currently
considering. First, we will administer personality tests that
not only measure personality constructs, but also constructs
such as emotional intelligence. In personality theory,
research shows that you can describe personality in five
dimensions: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion,
Agreeableness, and N euroticism. Conscientiousness, for
one, has been demonstrated to be relevant to the world of
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work. 35 So we will use personality instruments to assess
these constructs. We are also going to measure motives,
values, and interests, using a test that looks at an individual's capacity to fit into an organizational culture. 36 We will
also try to test the "potential for derailment." An instrument has been developed to study unsuccessful managers
and executives to find out why they were "derailed," and
why they were unsuccessful. 37 This instrument can give us
evaluations on dimensions such as "excitable," "diligent,"
"bold," and "leisurely."
Testing for emotional intelligence can determine
whether a person can regulate, manage and perceive emotions. One form of an emotional intelligence scale that is
being used today assesses whether an individual can detect
what is being expressed or shown by pictures of faces or
expressions. We are currently exploring measures that can
be used to assess this dimension of emotional intelligence.
We also will examine biographical information, as well
as an "accomplishment record form" that requires that a
respondent describe his/her previous history or experience
in certain areas, such as planning and organizing, researching, problem solving, and the like. The "accomplishment record form" and biographical data are used because
they reflect the axiom that "the best predictor of future
performance is past performance." As an example of a biographical item, we might ask the question, "How often have
you attended workshops, training sessions, or developmental courses that are designed to help you become a better
student?" The hypothesis here is that responses might
predict whether the respondent would have passion and engagement about his/her work, or an interest in self-development.

35. Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality
Dimensions and Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1,
1-26 (1991).
36. See Robert Hogan & Joyce Hogan, Motives, Values, Preferences Inventory
(Hogan Assessment Sys, Inc., 1996), available at http://www.performance
programs.com/pdf/HoganMVPIFacts2004.pdf.
37. See Joyce Hogan & Brent Holland, Using Theory to Evaluate Personality
and Job-Performance Relations: A Socioanalytic Perspective, 88 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 100 (2003).
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Situational judgment tests are another important type
of test used to predict performance. 38 These types of tests
present a situation such as the following: ''You're working
on a political campaign with five other volunteers, and you
usually take charge at the meetings. The end of the campaign is approaching, and one member who has not shown
up frequently also has not completed his responsibility.
How do you respond?" The test-taker has to pick from a set
of alternatives the behaviors that they would most likely
and least likely undertake. The responses are scored based
on a priori established scoring keys.
Moral responsibility can be tested, for example, by
using narratives or dilemmas that present situations that
may for example, put legal codes, moral responsibility, and
family obligations in conflict with each other. The respondent needs to indicate how he/she will respond to the situation.39 These tests describe a situation and ask which of
several choices you might make. You must also rate how
important
each of your choice factors is to your making the
decision. 40
Once we have developed our hypotheses about which
tests might predict particular effectiveness factors, we will
undertake empirical validation by giving these tests to
students and practicing attorneys. For the students in our
sample, we will get evaluations other than grades from
their instructors and perhaps their peers at Boalt Hall. For
the practicing attorneys, we will seek to have supervising
attorneys, peers, and the individuals themselves rate the
individual attorney's effectiveness on a relevant subset of
the twenty-six factors. We will determine through statistical analyses which test or set of tests can explain the study
participants' performance as measured by the performance
evaluations we will collect. We will examine how well these
new tests on their own predict attorney and law student
performance as well as how well they predict performance
38. See Michael A. McDaniel et al., Use of Situational Judgment Tests to
Predict Job Performance: A Clarification of the Literature, 86 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 730 (2001).

39. See James R. Rest et al., DIT2: Devising and Testing a Revised
Instrument of Moral Judgment, 91 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 644 (1999).
40. With such types of tests, we recognize that there are gender differences
and probably ethnic differences as well in the way people may respond to different test situations. We are attempting to take those differences and various critiques of the tests into account in our research.
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when combined with the traditional LSAT/UGPA index
score.
In summary, we have identified twenty-six factors that
reflect lawyering effectiveness. We are now identifying and
developing predictors that go beyond assessment of cognitive ability, which is what the LSAT tests. The LSAT/UGPA
index explains only 25 percent of law student success,
which leaves considerable room for improved prediction. In
addition, LSAT/UGPA index scores do not even try to
predict success in law practice. We hope that by adding
other tests and other types of information to the law admissions process, we will be able to explain subsets of the
twenty-six factors that describe effective lawyers. If we are
successful, we will have developed and empirically validated tests that could be used to identify applicants who are
the most qualified for admission to law school based on a
much broader set of relevant considerations than those currently in use.

Athena D. Mutua
Dr. Zedeck, I understand that the new approach to law
school admissions that you are developing may also have
the effect of increasing diversity. Is that correct?

Sheldon Zedeck
I have done most of my research and practice in the
world of employment work, and my experience is that if you
get beyond purely cognitive ability, if you use other factors
or even change the ways you test cognitive ability by using
methods other than multiple choice tests, you can decrease
the differences in results particularly between AfricanAmericans and Caucasians. Even for cognitive ability, I
have given tests that have been traditionally given as paper
and pencil examinations, but instead I have used video
demonstrations and asked the test takers to respond to
what they see in the videotape. By introducing this change
of method, I have been able to reduce the difference
between Caucasians and African-Americans by a half of a
standard deviation. In other words, I have reduced the racial disparity just by changing the format of a cognitive
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ability test; others have found similar results. 41 So there are
data from industry to show that if we are willing to look at
other devices for testing an individual's qualifications, racial disparities will significantly decrease. In the end, our
project does hope to increase the diversity of law schools
and ultimately the legal profession as a whole.

Margaret E. Montoya
I noticed that your effectiveness factors do not include
anything having to do with culture such as language or
community connections, and I ask that because virtually all
of the clients that I have contact with immediately need to
know what the culture and the language proficiency is of
the lawyers that they're being referred to. I am wondering
where in your schema that comes up?

Sheldon Zedeck
The answer is that we have lots of items in the set of
over 700 behavioral examples that represent how people
deal with cultures, how they understand different cultural
patterns, how well they develop relationships, and how they
develop networks across cultural boundaries. Those examples are used to define different levels of effectiveness for
some of these twenty-six factors. Today, I have focused on
presenting the 26 effectiveness factors. Another critical
aspect of our research in Phase I has been the identification
of the behavioral examples that will be used to define and
evaluate performance on those factors.

FrankH. Wu
In the Grutter case, 42 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
articulated the principle of inclusion. That is the bridge
that does not appear elsewhere in our jurisprudence and
one of the most important aspects of the opinion that she
wrote. She said that diversity promotes inclusion. She said

41. Neal Schmitt et al., Subgroup Differences Associated with Different
Measures of Some Common Job-Relevant Constructs, in 11 INT'L REV. OF INDUS.
& ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 115 (Cary L. Cooper & Ivan T. Robertson eds.,
1996).
42. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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the following: "In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the
path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness
and integrity of the educational institutions that provide
this training. ,'43
I would like to propose that it is necessary but not sufficient. As laudable as the University of Michigan Law School
is, as much as we may admire the outcomes of these caseswhich were uncertain until the moment the decisions were
handed down-nonetheless, if we favor racial integration, if
we favor especially the inclusion of African-Americans, Latinos, and other historically disadvantaged and underrepresented groups in law schools and elsewhere, we might
do well to be skeptical of "diversity."
Let me offer a cautionary tale about two politicians
whose names are now long forgotten except for this particular anecdote. In 1970, President Richard Nixon, starting
off in his term of office, had decided to appoint a southerner
to the Supreme Court. His first choice, Clement Hainesworth, was rejected. So President Nixon offered as his
second choice a Florida United States district judge named
G. Harold Carswell, who was an individual with a relatively
undistinguished record. As it became apparent that the
Senate was virtually certain to reject this nomination,
Senator Roman Hruska from Nebraska rose on the floor of
the Senate to speak. He said, immortally, in response to the
charge that Judge Carswell was mediocre, "Even if he is
mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and4
lawyers out there. They are entitled to representation.',4
You cannot have all Brandeises and Cardozos and
Frankfurters. Well, as you can imagine, with this ringing
endorsement, Carswell was promptly defeated, and he did
not advance and report.
As humorous as the quote is, I would like to take it
seriously, because I think the claim shows us a great deal
about the risks of abstracting diversity. When we talk about
diversity in the abstract-and this is how the Supreme
Court talks about it-those of us who are supportive of in43. Id. at 335.
44. William H. Honan, Roman L. Hruska Dies at 94; Leading Senate
Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 1999, at BB.
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creasing diversity run the same risk that we have run with
other civil rights advances: namely, the very concepts, the
very slogans and phrases that we have promoted, will be
appropriated and used with unintended consequences.
Allow me just to highlight at least three such consequences. First, it is possible to achieve racial diversity
without necessarily enhancing the integration of AfricanAmericans. One could have a college classroom or a law
school classroom or a medical school lab that had a large
number of Asian-Americans along with whites. You would
have a racially diverse classroom without necessarily
increasing the number of African-American students.
Indeed, had the Michigan cases come out differently, although campuses would quite quickly have found
themselves with a diminishing number of African-American
and Hispanic students, they almost certainly would have
maintained the Asian-American enrollments. Now, I point
this out not to suggest that it is laudable but, quite the contrary, to suggest that racial minority groups are not fungible. If we increase diversity by adding Asian-American
students, that does not address the classic black-white color
line and the "American dilemma," as Gunnar Myrdahl
called it in his classic study in 1954. 45 Regretfully, that is often what happens. Often you hear a claim, "Well, this institution discriminates against African-Americans," and the
response to that claim is, "Well, no we don't. We have lots of
Asian-Americans." This is entirely and obviously a non
sequitur.
Second, it would be possible to increase the number of
Black students without increasing the number of nativeborn African-Americans. It is possible to have diversity
without addressing the particular issues that face urban,
inner-city, impoverished African-Americans, especially
young men in the educational pipeline. By increasing the
number of foreign-born Black students, you could create a
student body that did not have a large number of nativeborn African-Americans. That in itself is not wrong. I would
be the first to suggest that we avoid a comparison that
would pit foreign-born blacks against native-born AfricanAmericans. Yet it suggests the danger of diversity as an
abstraction, when we do not make these distinctions, when
45. GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL., AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (Harper & Row 1969) (1944).
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we do not look at the historical circumstances and the
actual facts. We could have diversity by admitting a large
number of Caribbean students, Haitians, Africans, and others who would not identify themselves nor perhaps be identified by others, as African-Americans.
Third, because Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter
abstracts even beyond race, it is clear that the Supreme
Court needs to discuss diversity in all of its forms. There is
the possibility-as has already happened-that people will
make much the same argument that Senator Hruska made
about G. Harold Carswell, namely, that we ought to add
representation of every conceivable demographic group. In a
recent issue in the Chronicle of Higher Education, for
example, demagogu.e David Horowitz engages in a debate
with Stanley Fish. 46 David Horowitz made the claim-and
let us for a moment posit that the empirical basis of the
claim is accurate or is not laughably disturbing-that college campuses lack ideological diversity. He claims that if
you were to survey faculties at law schools and other
academic departments, you would find that they were
predominantly on the left politically, that there are not a
large number of political conservatives. There are not many
reactionaries. He does not put it this way, but I would add
that there are not many fascists and neo-Nazis, either.
Well, if we wish to promote merely diversity, we have difficulty responding to Senator Hruska, David Horowitz, and
others who would say, if we merely want representation,
why do we not have more representation of individuals who
are mediocre? Why do we not have more representation of
neo-Nazis or skinheads? What about the over-representation, for example, of Jewish faculty, Asian faculty and the
under-representation of white, Christian males? Now, I
think those arguments can be refuted, but it cannot be done
by dismissing them out of hand. It requires adopting a more
nuanced principle.
It is especially appropriate here at the State University
of New York at Buffalo Law School, which is renowned for
its involvement in the field oflaw and society, that we question the abstraction of this doctrine. Justice O'Connor has
announced that diversity is a compelling state interest. For
46. See David Horowitz, In Defense of Intellectual Diversity, CHRON. OF
Feb. 13, 2004, at 12; Stanley Fish, "Intellectual Diversity": The
Trojan Horse of a Dark Design, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 13, 2004, at 13.
HIGHER EDUC.,
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that, she and the Court must be commended. But I would
suggest that we ought not to ask about diversity merely in
the abstract-diversity as difference. Instead, it might
serve us in advancing the broader interest of racial justice
and civil rights to look more specifically, not just at whether
the path to leadership is open, as she puts it, to every race
and ethnicity, but to whom it has been closed, how, and
why? What will be needed to remedy it in the concrete? It is
not enough to say merely that every group has the same
problem of access or has the same unequal access or that
they have the same need to achieve a critical mass. There
are particular problems that we want to address. So, I close
with the thought that in seeking diversity we may do what
Oscar Wilde once warned us of, namely, that the only thing
worse than not getting the last word is getting it. 47
Charles E. Daye
I will discuss some preliminary work that I am doing
with three colleagues-Dr. Abigail T. Panter, Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of North CarolinaChapel Hill, Dr. Walter R. Allen, Professor of Sociology at
the University of California-Los Angeles, and Dr. Linda F.
Wightman, Professor and Chair of the Department of Educational Research Methodology at the University of North
Carolina-Greensboro. I am Professor of Law at the School of
Law at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
The title of my presentation is "What's Race Got to Do
With It? An Empirical Study of 'Race' and Educational Diversity. '148
This is a presentation about a research project that my
colleagues and I are undertaking under protest. I am kind
of annoyed that I have to do a project like this. A major reason I thought about doing a research project of this sort was
because there are some folks who like to deny that race is
47. See OSCAR WILDE, LADYWINDERMERE'S FAN act 3:
"In this world there are only two tragedies. One is not getting what one
wants, and the other is getting it. The last is much the worst; the last
is a real tragedy!"
48. The term "race" is used here to include common racial and ethnic
classifications. We are aware that the very concept of race can be controversial.
See, e.g., Elbert Lin, Identifying Asian American, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 217 (2004);
Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of
Recent Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2003).
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salient. One court has gone so far as to opine that, "The use
of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves a
student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no
more rational on its own terms than would be choices based
upon the physical size or blood type of applicants."49 My
experiences as a Black American teach me that, as an empirical matter, that perspective is patently refutable. 50
Another court pronounced that, "If the goal in creating a
diverse student body is to develop a university community
where students are exposed to persons of different cultures,
outlooks, and experiences, a white applicant in some circumstances may 51make a greater contribution than a nonwhite applicant." This pronouncement is true, of course.
True, but irrelevant. Also the District Court in the Michigan affirmative action case had pronounced that, "The
connection between race and viewpoint is tenuous, at best.
The defendants walk a fine line in simultaneously arguing
that one's viewpoints are not determined by one's race but
that certain viewpoints might not be voiced if students of
particular races are not admitted in significant numbers."52
It is, of course, one thing to say that race does not determine viewpoint. It is something of a giant leap to the
conclusion that there is no connection between viewpoint
and race, if for no other reason than that race in America
influences one's experiences and experiences, in turn, may
influence one's perspective. Yet those who assert that race
is not relevant speak ex cathedra, as it were, suffering no
burden of proof as to the normative assertion or the relevance of the assertions they make. Only those asserting the
positive are burdened with the obligation to offer empirical
evidence.
Professor Wu has mentioned that we have got the
wrong issue. His point underscores the second reason this
project causes me anguish. The Supreme Court has taken
49. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996) (emphasis added).
50. I even set out to demonstrate how this perspective was at odds with reality in an allegorical parody of the Hopwood case. See Charles E. Daye,
Monday Morning Blues: or, Is Race Really Insignificant?, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 122
(1997).
51. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1253 (11th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(emphasis added), reu'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.), affd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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off the table any question about social justice, any question
of distributive justice, and any question of racial reconciliation,53 if you will. The Supreme Court rejected arguments
that advanced the idea that a distinction could and should
be made between racial classifications
that were "invidious"
and those that were "benign."54 So the Court erected a tall
barrier to the making of remedial gestures toward advancing racial equality. But it did not stop there.55 We cannot
seek to enroll a certain number of minorities.
We cannot
seek to achieve a certain racial balance. 56 And even though
the Court acknowledges that, "No one doubts that there
has
been serious racial discrimination in this country,"57 any
attempt on the part of an actor to correct for or to take race
into account on
the basis of "societal discrimination" is
impermissible. 58 Similarly, educators may not consider race
on the basis that we are t111ng
to train minorities to service
underserved communities. 9 Nor can race be considered on
the ground that black
students need role models in the educational setting. 60 The Court has held that even when an
actor is trying to correct its own prior discriminatory
conduct, that actor cannot take race into account unless its
prior discrimination has been the subject of "judicial, legislative, or administrative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations."61

53. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial
Reconciliation in the United States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 903 (2003).
54. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (holding
that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications regardless of whether
they are claimed to be benign or for remedial purposes. The Court said, "We
thus reaffirm the view . . . that the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited
by a particular classification.").
55. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell,
J.).

56. Id.
57. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
58. Id. at 274 ("This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification."); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (The goal
of remedying prior discrimination "was far more focused than the remedying of
the effects of 'societal discrimination,' an amorphous concept of injury that may
be ageless in its reach into the past.") (Powell, J.).
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11 (Powell, J.).
60. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
61. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 ("We have never approved a classification that
aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
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So, the entire discussion has pushed the justice question completely off the table. That's why this is project
causes me great anguish.
This state of affairs brought us to the diversity rationale, which Bakke 62 said was permissible, and which Grutter
affirmed is still permissible. Professor Wu has already
pointed out some of the pitfalls of the Court's approach to
"diversity," and the diversity rationale is problematic in its
use of the diversity idea in just the ways Professor Wu
points out. Diversity, apparently as far as the Court is concerned, is "unanchored" from the justice question. 63 Having
prohibited nearly every efficacious use of "affirmative
measures" to assure admissions of under-represented
minorities to elite institutions, the Court uses a "diversity''
rationale that is not contextualized in any meaningful way.
It is not anchored to any social justice rationale, compensatory justice rationale, distributive justice rationale, or even
within its historical milieu. So diversity is a concept that is
fully adrift from justice. If the diversity rationale as the
Court uses it, has any underpinning it is some sort of "majoritarian
utility construct." At least as attributed to Justice
Stevens, 64 affirmative action under the diversity rationale
will be used in a highly utilitarian fashion by the majority.
He is reported to have said, "Presumably it is in the universities' self-interest to eliminate the preferences as soon as it
is no longer necessary. . . . There is no reason for the
majority to grant preferences to the minority unless those
preferences serve the best interests of the majority."65 Justice
O'Connor apparently was somewhat less convinced. She
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.").
62. Id.
63. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper
Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757 (1996-1997) (criticizing Justice Powell's
formulation for being divorced from any corrective justice dimension, and as dependent on the college's conception of what benefits it, rather than how to effect
justice for the victims of societal discrimination).
64. Justice Stevens voted with the majority to uphold the affirmative action
program employed at the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter, 539 U.S.
306.
65. Charles Lane, Stevens Gives Rare View Of Court's 'Conference': Justice
Details Thoughts on Affirmative Action Case, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 19,
2003, at AOl (emphasis added) (reporting on a talk that Justice Stevens gave at
a luncheon in his honor sponsored by the Chicago Bar Association on September
18, 2003).
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went on to express her "expectation" that66affirmative action
programs would end in twenty-five years.
Now, with that preliminary matter finished let me turn
to our project.
Does race contribute to educational diversity? Grutter
holds that the Constitution permits the narrowly tailored
use of race in admissions to assure the educational benefits
that flow from diversity. 67 Grutter can be seen as working
out of the following syllogism: the major premise is that an
educational institution has a compelling interest in deriving
the benefits of educational diversity. The minor premise is
that racial diversity contributes to educational diversity.
The conclusion follows that, therefore, race may be considered as a "plus" factor when used in a narrowly tailored
way. That is what I call "the Grutter syllogism." First, the
major premise is a question of constitutional law; that is,
whether the legal and policy underpinning of diversity is
constitutionally acceptable. The minor premise, however, is
empirical: that race contributes to educational diversity.
But for judicial and other assertions to the contrary, one's
intuition might have been that the minor premise is true.
What, if any, relationship exists between race and
educational diversity? The research project on which we are
working is to make a first attempt at investigating that
relationship. Proponents argue that racial diversity is critical to assure diversity of perspective, experience, expectations, and values. Opponents say race is irrelevant. The
problem is that neither argument is grounded in a scientific
investigation of that narrow issue. 68
66. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 ("The Court expects that 25 years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today.").
67. Id. at 309.
68. Diversity as a concept has been used in contemporary discussions of
higher education since the mid-twentieth century. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) (segregated education provided at a makeshift black law school
was not substantially equal to education available at the University of Texas
Law School, in part, because of a lack of diversity among the students enrolled
in the all-black law school). Diversity has been linked to deeper historical
antecedents with research pushing the consideration of diversity to Biblical
times. See Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and Now,
22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915 (2000-2001).
Although the precise question of whether and, if so how, race contributes to
educational diversity as the Supreme Court has employed the term has not yet
been examined specifically, many researchers have studied multiple aspects of

2004)

WHO GETS IN?

559

diversity. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK C. BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE
RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 158-64 (1998); Jeffrey F. Milem, The Educational
Benefits of Diversity: Evidence from Multiple Sectors, in COMPELLING INTEREST:
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
(Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003); Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive
Educational Effects of Racial Diversity on Campus, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED:
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 175-186 (Gary Orfield &
Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001); Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in
American Higher Education?, 52 U. FLA. L. REV. 861, 863 (2000); Arnold H.
Loewy, Taking Bakke Seriously: Distinguishing Diversity from Affirmative
Action in the Law School Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (19981999).
More particularized empirical examinations include: Octavio Villalpando,

The Impact of Diversity and Multiculturalism on All Students: Findings from a
National Study, 40 NAT. AsS'N OF STUDENT PERSONNEL ADMINS. J. 124 (2002),
available at h ttp://publications.naspa.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1194&
context=naspajoumal (last visited May 25, 2004); Daniel Solorzano, Walter R.
Allen and Grace Carroll, Keeping Race in Place: Racial Microaggressions and
Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, Berkeley, 23 CHICANOLATINO L. REV. 15 (2002); Alexander W. Astin, Diversity and Multiculturalism
on the Campus: How are Students Affected?, CHANGE, Mar. 1993, at 44; Gary
Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in
Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001), available
at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/researcMawmichigan/Diversity
andLegalEducation.pdf (last visited May 25, 2004); Mitchell J. Chang, The

Impact of an Undergraduate Diversity Course Requirement on Students' Level of
Racial Views and Attitudes, 51 J. GEN. EDUC. 21 (2002); AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
EDUCATION & AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, DOES
DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? THREE RESEARCH STUDIES ON DIVERSITY IN
COLLEGE CLASSROOMS Executive Summary (2000), available at http://www.
aaup.org/lssues/AffirmativeAction/Archives/2000/DIVSUMY.PDF; Richard A.
White, Preliminary Report, Law School Faculty Views on Diversity in the
Classroom and the Law School Community (unpublished copy on file with
Charles E. Daye); Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, in UNIV. OF MICHIGAN, THE
COMPELLING NEED FOR DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION, available at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/gurintoc.html (last visited
May 25, 2004); SYLVIA HURTADO, JEFFREY MILEM. ALMA CLAYTON-PEDERSEN &
WALTER R. ALLEN, ENACTING DIVERSE LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS: IMPROVING THE
CLIMATE FOR RACIAilETHNIC DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1999); Walter R.
Allen & Daniel Solorzano, Affirmative action, Educational Equity and Campus
Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12
BERKELEY LA R.AzA L.J. 327 (2001); Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's
Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 L. &
Soc. INQUIRY 395 (2000); Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority
Graduates in Practice: Answers to Methodological Queries, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
585 (2000); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An

Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law
School Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997).
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Our study is going to undertake to see if we can capture
certain personal background factors including race, ethnicity, gender, age, marital status, economic status, and
education. Then the question will be whether these
personal factors can be related in some way that connects
race (and other factors) to educational diversity. Is there an
empirically demonstrable relationship between race and
educational diversity sufficient to support an assertion that
racial diversity is more likely to result in educational diversity than would exist in a non-racially diverse educational
setting?
We have put together five "diversity construct areas"diversity of family background, diversity of experience, diversity of perspective, diversity of educational expectations,
and diversity of career goals and aspirations. Diversity of
family background includes demographic and social family
factors, such as family size, socio-economic status, culture,
customs, and traditions that influence a student's perceptions and interpretations of curricular material. Diversity of
experience refers to positive and negative life experiences
that each student brings to the classroom and the campus.
These might include exposure to a variety of customs,
cultures, and perspectives as well as experiences of prejudice and disadvantage that might influence a student's
perspective on the social order. Diversity of perspective
includes, among other things, differences in values, beliefs,
conceptions of the world, and political orientation. Analysts
have argued that when members within a group of students
hold different beliefs about what is important, worthy,
beautiful, and good in life will be more likely to discover for
themselves the depth and interminability of the disputes in
which human beings find themselves entangled
than a
group whose members share homogenous values. 69 Diversity
of educational expectations refers to predispositions that
students bring to both curricular interpretations and classroom interactions. These predispositions will be manifested
in rates of class participation, the way that assignments
and class projects are prepared and presented, and whether
students participate in study groups, class project groups,
and other study/social influences. Diversity of career goals
and aspirations ties differences in reasons for pursuing
69. See Anthony T. Kronman, supra note 68, at 863; Arnold H. Loewy, supra
note 68, at 1486.
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higher education to different foci that students bring to
issues under study and to the ways students foresee that
their educations will be beneficial to themselves or to their
communities after they leave the formal educational setting.
Second, we will examine the role, if any, race plays as an
aspect of educational diversity in fostering institutional
goals in identified educational domains. We identify three
"educational domains." The domains are not entirely distinct, but place emphasis on different foci. First, the
"individual domain" emphasizes enriching each student's
educational experiences by deepening understandings
about ideas through exposure to many different perspectives and by making educational encounters richer, livelier,
and more interesting. Second, the "institutional domain"
emphasizes having a presence of diverse groups, widening
the scope of perspectives expressed on campus, and
increasing the range of activities, programs, and interests
represented within institutions. Third, the "social domain"
emphasizes creating opportunities for students to interact
with others of different backgrounds, races, and cultures
with the goal of increasing their abilities to interact positively and effectively in a diverse society after graduation.
We hope to tie together the personal demographic factors and these diversity constructs in a way that informs us
whether we are getting anything out of racial diversity that
otherwise we would not have. We are really trying to see
the grounding in the assertion that diversity adds a value
in educational settings.
.
The possible impact of our study is that if we find little
or no evidence of a relationship between race and diversity,
then the claim that race-conscious admissions are essential
will be weakened. Another possible impact of the study is
that if we find a meaningful or strong relationship between
race and diversity, the argument that race is a material factor in achieving educational diversity will be strengthened.
This dichotomy reflects the danger of social science
research. We develop our research hypothesis, but we are
not sure the data will prove our hypothesis right. In that
sense, we are embarking on a dangerous quest, but I'm convinced enough as an African-American that my life would
not be the same as it has been if I had been born white, that
I'm willing to take that chance.
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Athena D. Mutua
We have a little bit of time to take a question from the
panel.

FrankH. Wu
One of the arguments that comes up and distresses me
is that sometimes people say to me, ''Well, you teach at
Howard University, and that is a predominantly black
institution. Why isn't Howard University regarded as a discriminatory institution?" I happen to believe in the value of
Howard and other predominantly black, historically black,
institutions. I wonder, is there a way that we can distinguish or explain why that type of institution, as a majority/minority institution, is valuable even as we promote the
racial diversity of institutions such as Michigan, Buffalo,
and so forth?

Charles E. Daye
Well, that is one of the tough questions. I served for
four years as Dean of the Law School at North Carolina
Central University, and we wrestled with that problem
perpetually. I think there are multiple answers.
First of all, Howard University was founded under the
auspices of the Freedmen's Bureau 70 that was really the
first affirmative action program for 71 the former slaves,
although the effort WflS soon scuttled. Today, I think the
reason we have a controversy over affirmative action (resolved for the time being by Grutter), is that there are elite
schools that would not enroll a substantial number of minorities because of something called the "test-score gap"
70. See HARRY G. ROBINSON III & HAzEL RUTH EDWARDS. THE LONG WALK:
THE PLACEMAKING LEGACY OF HOWARD UNIVERSITY (1996); see also HARRY G.
ROBINSON III & lIAzEL RUTH EDWARDS, THE LONG WALK: THE PLACEMAKING
LEGACY OF HOWARD UNIVERSITY Development Framework, at http://www.
howard.edu/longwalk/ (May 25, 2004).
71. See, e.g., Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 206
F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The promise of significant, sustained aid and land
was breached, but during its approximate six years, "The Freedmen's Bureau,
which ceased operation in 1871, had spent more than $5 million on education
for ex-slaves, helping to finance some 4,300 schools with 9,300 teachers and
nearly a quarter of a million students." Ronald S. Sullivan, Jr., Multiple Ironies:
Brown at 50, 47 How. L.J. 29, 45, n.75 (2003).
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between certain
minorities and the general test-taking
population. 72 Ifwe did not have the test-score gap, we would
not have a need for race-conscious admission policies. 73 So
we get people who want to have it both ways. In a shorthand, and, of course, over-simplified way, let me point out
our dilemma. First, we over-rely on law school admission
test scores and GPAs and that helps to create the problem
of insufficient diversity. But we also believe in diversity. So,
we have to create exceptions to follow through on that
belief. Schools like Howard and NCCU probably do not apply the LSAT and GPA as the sole measures of admissibility and preparation for law the way some other places apply
these numerical indicators.
Second, there also is a culture and a history that surrounds each one of the historically minority law schools,
including Howard. Some students, racial minorities or not,
might be inclined to choose Howard because of its classical
relationship with the struggle for justice for minorities in
the United States.
So, I think there are multiple responses, but I do not
think the answer is an easy one. I do think even Howard
would say, "We want
to have diversity." We can go back to
Sweatt v. Painter, 74 which is one of the cases in the 1950s
that said that students need diversity on racial grounds and
that Heman Marion Sweatt could not get that at an allblack, under-funded, makeshift, law school hastily and belatedly concocted to keep him segregated. If he had chosen
to go to a historically black school, that would be fine, but if

72. See Linda F. Wightman, supra note 68.
73. Why there is a test-score gap is controversial. Arguments include educational deprivations at all level of education for minorities, continued effects of
racial discrimination, cultural and racial bias in tests, low economic opportunities suffered by minorities, and a phenomenon known as stereotype threat. See
generally Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest? 10
Reasons Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good Law
Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593 (2001); Claude M.
Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 616-18 (1997); Gail L. Heriot &
Christopher T. Wonnell, Standardized Tests Under the Magnifying Glass: A
Defense of the LSAT Against Recent Charges of Bias, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 467
(2003).
74. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Segregated education provided at a makeshift black
law school was not substantially equal to education available at the University
of Texas Law School, in part, because of a lack of diversity among the students
enrolled in the all-black law school.).
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he wanted to go to the University of Texas, he might, in the
court's conception, have a more diverse educational experience. 75 But my point is that the court thought, way back
then, that a law student could derive advantages from a
more diverse educational experience that would better enable participation as a full member of the legal profession.

Margaret E. Montoya
Good Afternoon. Thank you for inviting me to participate in this academic encounter.
"Who gets in?" Well, the question is rather innocent,
but behind it are multiple histories of exclusion and discrimination. From my vantage point, it is important that we
begin by acknowledging a historic and contemporary
reality, namely that race continues to structure individual
relations and institutional arrangements, so that some
segments of society are privileged by it and others are subordinated. In Grutter, we have heard Sandra Day O'Connor
acknowledge that race matters. Race matters throughout
the society and not just at the law school door, but figuring
out the racial dimensions of who gets in requires localized
analyses and local responses. New Mexico can be an
instructive example because of its large Hispanic and Native populations and its well-integrated political leadership.
The state's only law school has been a national leader on
issues of affirmative action in student admissions. However, I would posit that opponents of diversity have created
an excessive caution among academic administrators that
has resulted in retrenchment on these issues throughout
the nation, and it has also been felt in New Mexico.
So, let me give you a thumbnail history of the University of New Mexico Law School. That history would probably begin with an acknowledgment that Fred Hart, who became dean in the mid-1960s, is credited with transforming
the state bar by changing the law school's admission
procedures so that large numbers of Hispanic and Native
students were admitted. Dean Hart came in at a time when
the school was virtually all white-all professors, students
and probably all the staff were white. Some years there had
been two or three Hispanics, and I believe there had been
75. But that would be very problematic if he were the only Black student
there.
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one or two Native Americans who had been accepted, and I
understand that early on there was even one Hispanic
woman who was admitted, but these students often failed to
complete their studies.
In the late 1960s, Dean Hart learned about the CLEO
Program, 76 and that was to become the model to conditionally admit significant numbers of Native American and
Hispanic students. By the end of the early 1970s, the Law
School had created its own conditional admissions
programs. One was called PLSI-the Pre-Law Summer Institute for Native students, a program that exists even
today. Another version called "Instituto" emerged for
Hispanic students, but it also was open to other students.
These programs were phenomenally effective. By the early
1990s, the University of New Mexico Law School's entering
class was about forty-five percent students of color. These
students who lacked the traditional numerical predictors
for success in law school, namely high LSAT scores, were
nonetheless admitted. They enrolled, most graduated
passed the bar, and went on to productive careers. Some became prominent members of the bar and the judiciary,
serving on courts at all levels including the state's Supreme
Court. The few who did not pass the bar found employment
and, in different ways, used their legal education, often to
help their home communities.
But in 1996, the Hopwood case 77 was decided by the
Fifth Circuit, and the University of New Mexico Law School
decided that, although it was not bound by the decision
since New Mexico sits in the Tenth Circuit, it would change
its admissions policies by removing any mention of race. Although the Law School did retain ethnicity as one aspect of
diversity, it also decided that it would increase the number
of out-of-state students from ten percent to fifteen percent.
The result has been that the percentage of students of color
in each entering class has been lowered by about ten percent. The Law School went from an average of about fortyfive percent to an average of about thirty-five percent. More
recently, the numbers have begun climbing again and the

76. Information about the thirty-five year history of the Council on Legal
Educational Opportunity's summer pre-law programs can be found at
http://cleoscholars.com/all aboutcleo/index.htm (last visited May 25, 2004).
77. Hopwood v. State, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g en bane denied, 84
F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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faculty, under the direction of Dean Suellyn Scarnecchia,
has undertaken a comprehensive review of the admission
policy and procedures.
Let me give you some demographic information about
New Mexico. With Hawaii and California, it is one of three
minority-majority states. In other words, the 2000 census
found that 55.3 percent of New
Mexico's population was
non-White or White Hispanics. 78 Of these, 42 percent identify as Hispanic, Latino, and Chicano, compared
to a national average between 12 and 13 percent. 79 Native peoples
represent 9 percent of the total in New Mexico as compared
to a national average of 0.7 percent. 80 The state has about 2
percent African-Americans and less than 2 percent AsianAmericans.81 New Mexico is also the poorest state in the na-83
tion.82 Only the District of Columbia ranks any lower.
Twenty percent of our 84state's population consistently falls
below the poverty line. The state's schools show patterns
of racial and ethnic segregation, yet New Mexico has one of
the most equitable fun.ding schemes for education in the
nation. Public education is funded out of the general revenues rather than through property taxes.
There is another feature of the state that complicates
this question of who gets in, and that is the complex relationship between the state and federal governments and the
twenty-two sovereign Indian governments within New
Mexico's borders. Many of the Indian nations and pueblos
maintain their own schools and most have language recovery programs to preserve the Indian languages. The New
Mexico Law School has long had one of the outstanding
Indian law programs. Recently, Professor Christine Zuni
Cruz (Isleta Pueblo member) has created a tribal law program with a law clinic and an electronic law journal to
provide targeted services for tribal peoples in the state.
Thus, the state of New Mexico represents a context in
which educational attainment is affected by race and eth78. U.S. Census Bureau, New Mexico Quickfacts, at http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/35000.html (May 25, 2004).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See U.S. Census, Small Area Income & Poverty Estimates, at http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe.html (last visited May 26, 2004).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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nicity and the widespread poverty. New Mexico's graduate
and professional programs play a central role in maintaining a high level of diversity among the state's lawyers,
doctors, and other professionals, but the success of the
doctoral programs depends on the entire educational
system from pre-primary schools through the undergraduate colleges. The loss of students from the elementary levels
to high school is enormous, and it constricts the number of
those who can go on to college.
To see how the pipeline narrows in New Mexico, I
would ask you to consider these numbers. There
are approximately 13,000 Hispanic seventh graders. 85 In the year
2000, there were 7 ,554 high school graduates who were
Hispanics. 86 Of these 7,554, 2,122 go on to earn Bachelor's
degrees, and this is taking into account all87colleges and universities, public and private, in
the state. Of89 these 2,122,
88
some 28
go
on
to
get
Ph.D.s,
31 get J.D.s, and 22 get
M.D.s, 90 or a total of about 81 go on to the doctoral level.
What does this have to do with law schools, and what
does this have to do with law professors? Well, I am
currently serving as Director of the Southwest Hispanic Research Institute, and in that capacity I have had the opportunity to begin working with a coalition of community
people who are committed to asking the question, "Who gets
in?," in a broader context. We are focused on the entire
pipeline from high school into the post-graduate programs.
This coalition includes advocacy groups, business people
and entrepreneurs, politicians, and civic leaders, and educators from kindergarten to middle school, high school,

85. New Mexico Public Education Department, District Reports, at http://
www.sde.state.nm.us/div/ais/data/dcrfactsheets.html (May 25, 2004).
86. Id.
87. Southern Regional Education Board, Table 42: Bachelor's Degrees
Awarded by Private and Public Colleges and Universities, available at http://
www.sreb.org/main/EdData/FactBook/indexoftables03.asp (last visited May 25,
2004).
88. Southern Regional Education Board, Table 46: Doctoral Degrees
Awarded by Private and Public Colleges and Universities, available at
http://www.sreb.org/main/EdData/FactBook/indexoftables03.asp (last visited
May 25, 2004).
89. Information on file with Susan Mitchell, Director of Admissions,
University of New Mexico School of Law.
90. Information on file with Dr. Valerie Romero-Leggott, Director of
Cultural and Ethnic Programs, University of New Mexico School of Medicine.
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community colleges, and a number of different departments
at the university.
A number of forces are converging at this time, and it
makes our coalition work quite timely. For example, last
Friday Governor Bill Richardson announced his priorities
for the next legislative session, and his number one priority
will be reforming the higher education system in the 2005
legislative session. On February 10th, there was a banquet
honoring the state's Hispanic legislators, and the theme of
that banquet was "Si Se Puede" (Cesar Chavez's motto of
''Yes, We Can"), applied to educational achievement. In
today's Albuquerque Journal, I have an op-ed91 article appearing entitled, "Doctorates Elude Hispanics." The article
makes a series of recommendations. It begins by suggesting
that we need a comprehensive data analysis of the pipeline.
We need to figure out how students are faring from one
level to the next, and this analysis needs to be broken out to
see how both boys and girls, rural students, tribal students,
low-income students, and those with poor English skills are
doing. Secondly, we need to identify retention programs,
such as the ENLACE projects funded by the Kellogg Foundation, that are currently working. Third, we need an
attitudinal change, because most of the time students who
do not continue on are described as ''high risk" or "educationally disadvantaged." I suggest that we need to abandon
this language of educational deficits and learn to see these
students as bringing a different set of skills and competencies and adjust our classrooms to develop those skills.
Fourth, we need to lower specific barriers such as standardized tests. Finally, we need to create a system of financial incentives for students to return to work in underserved communities.
Let me mention two other things that are going on. I
have been using my classroom in order to create a place
where law students can respond to these kinds of social
issues. Last semester, my students wrote an amicus brief in
the Grutter case. This semester, my students are involved
in planning a conference for school superintendents and
principals on the historic and contemporary aspects of
school segregation in New Mexico to honor the fiftieth anni-

91. Margaret E. Montoya, Doctorates Elude Hispanics, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Mar. 8, 2004, at A12.
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versary of Brown v. Board of Education. 92 Another group of
students is doing a comprehensive pipeline analysis that is
examining the leaks in the system and engaging a number
of law school faculty, administrators, students and
alumni/ae in a conversation about the obstacles along the
path to a law degree.
Finally, I have been working in the Los Lunas Minimum Security Prison, outside of Albuquerque looking at the
pipeline from the other end, from the perspective of those
who have not completed their high school education. If we
do not understand why people get pushed out and what
insights and wisdom they have to share with us about how
we might go about keeping students in school, we are not
going to be as successful as we can be.
So what does all of this mean for law school admissions?
Well, our approach is a long-term, systemic one. We intend
to make changes all along the pipeline, and we understand
that we might have success with only a small number of
students. But we feel confident that we will have a better
integrated system: one that is also more just and inclusive.
Finally, we seek an educational system in which affirmative
action is understood as a mechanism to secure educational
benefits that translate into competent leadership for all
segments of our multicultural society. As Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote in her majority opinion in the Grutter
case, "[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's
leaders .... In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the
path to leadership be visibly open to talented
and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity."93

David L. Chambers
I taught at the University of Michigan for thirty-four
years, including the last six years while Grutter was being
litigated, but I do not plan to talk about Grutter today.
Instead, I want to take a longer view of the questions, "Who
gets into law school?," and "Who gets into the legal profession?," and discuss why the success in Grutter, however
gratifying, solves so little.
92. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
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Most of us in this room seem to share the belief that it
is important to have large numbers of African-American,
Native American and Hispanic law students and attorneys
in the United States. (Within the term "Hispanic," I am
bunching together several quite different groups-most
numerously, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, and
Cuban-Americans. I wish I could do better, and will give
more detailed information where it is available and important.)
The good news, of course, is that the country has many,
many more African-American, Hispanic and Native-American lawyers than we had in the years before affirmative
action. At Michigan, just to give one example, about thirty
African-Americans graduated from the law school in the
thirty years before 1970, while about 900 graduated in the
30 years after. Many other schools can tell the same story.
Despite this enormous progress, our country still has a long
way to go before minority lawyers are represented in the
legal profession in numbers roughly proportional to the
minority population. In the United States in 2001, 6.5
percent of newly employed lawyers were African-American,94
but 12 percent of Americans were African-American.
Similarly, 4.9 percent of new lawyers were
Hispanic, while
12.5 percent of Americans were Hispanic. 95
Why does this gap persist after 30 years of affirmative
action?
For a few minutes, let's look together at the key
moments in the chain of achievements of all persons who
become lawyers in the United States today and particularly
at two events that occur before admission to law schoolgraduation from high school and graduation from collegeand three events that occur after admission to law schoolgraduation from law school, passing the bar, and securing a
job. I am deeply indebted to Gita Wilder of the Law School
Admission Council for pulling
together this information in a
single accessible place. 96 As we will see, minority persons
fall disproportionately out of the pool of potential lawyers at
each of these points.

94. GITA Z. WILDER, THE ROAD TO LAW SCHOOL AND BEYOND: EXAMINING
CHALLENGES TO RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2
(LSAC 2003).

95. Id.
96. Id.
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First, high school and college. African-American and
Hispanic students finish high school and college at lower
rates than whites. To be sure, high-school graduation rates
for African-Americans and Hispanics
have improved
markedly over the past thirty years, 97 but the high school
completion rate remains distressingly low, particularly for
Hispanics. In 1999, among Americans between eighteen
and twenty-four, 82 percent of whites, 73 percent of African-Americans, and 62 percent of Hispanics had completed
high school. 98 The completion
rate was below 50 percent for
Mexican-Americans. 99 A disturbingly high percentage of
African-American and Hispanic males who drop
out of high
school end up in the criminal justice system. 100
The story at the college level is similar. Among those
who graduate from high school, attendance at college for at
least one year is closely similarly for whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics, but attendance at four-year colleges is
disproportionately
lower among African-Americans and
Hispanics. 101 Especially distressing is the proportion of African-American and Hispanic students who begin but fail to
graduate from four-year colleges. Consider the large universities in Division I of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, an organization that monitors college completion for athletes and in the process gathers completion rates
for all racial groups. These Division I institutions supply a
large proportion of the nation's law students. In 1998, 37
percent of African-Americans and 48 percent of Hispanics
who started at these universities completed their degrees
within six years, in comparison to 59 percent of whites. 102
97. Id. at 9. (In 1960, the high school completion rate for African-Americans
was about 20 percent; it rose to 73 percent in 1998. In 1970 (the first year for
which data is available), the high school completion rate for Hispanics was 32
percent; it rose to 60 percent in 1998.).
98. Id. at 10.
99. Id.
100. Among male high-school dropouts aged 18-24, 30 percent of AfricanAmericans and 19 percent of native-born Hispanics are currently incarcerated
or on parole, in comparison to 11 percent of whites. See MICHAEL WALD & TIA
MARTINEZ, CONNECTED BY 25: IMPROVING THE LIFE CHANCES OF THE COUNTRY'S
MOST VULNERABLE 14-24 YEAR OLDS 8 fig.3 (William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation,
Working
Paper,
November
2003),
available
at
http://www.hewlett.org/NR/rdonlyres/60C 17B69-8A76-4F99-BB3B-84251E4E5A
19/0/FinalVersionofDisconnectedYouthPa per. pdf.
101. See WILDER, supra note 94, at 11.
102. Id. at 12.
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(The white graduation rate is also low, but still sixty percent higher than the rate for African-Americans.)
Putting high school and college together, census data
reveal that of all Americans between the ages of 25 and 29,
27 percent of whites, but only 16 percent of African-Americans and
10 percent of Hispanics have a baccalaureate
degree. 103
I would make two points about high school and college
completion. The first is that much emphasis is placed today
on changing admissions criteria to law schools-changes
such as reducing the weight attached to the LSAT or supplementing the LSAT with new tests such as those that
· Sheldon Zedeck and Marjorie Schultz are trying to develop.
I applaud those efforts. I think the project of Zedeck and
Schultz is the most exciting attempt to broaden the range of
capacities we look for in admissions that has occurred
during my career. Still, we have to recognize that these
efforts to change application decisions will, in themselves,
do nothing to increase the numbers of African-American
and Hispanic students who successfully complete a college
degree. And so long as law schools and the American Bar
Association continue to require a college diploma as a condition of admission to law school (and they will certainly
continue to do so), law schools will continue to have a disproportionately small pool of minority college graduates to
draw upon at the point of admissions.
The second point is that while the high school and
college completion rates among minorities is a serious
problem for this country, it is a problem that the law
schools themselves can do very little to solve. Making positive improvements will require increasing economic opportunity for the parents of minority children, improving
elementary and secondary education, providing more
substantial financial aid for college expenses and much
more, none of which law schools themselves can directly
make happen. To be sure, some universities are beginning
to set up creative links with high schools that have large
minority enrollments and a few law schools are beginning
to create programs for minority college students while they
103. Id. at 11. Sixteen percent of Hispanics age 24-26 born in the United
States have a bachelors degree or higher in comparison to only 4.3 percent of
Hispanics not born in the United States. See MICHAEL WALD & TIA MARTINEZ,
supra note 100, at 6 tbl.l.
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are still in college, but such programs even if adopted
widely can reach only a small proportion of minority youths.
The next stage in the pipeline is the application of
college graduates to law school, the point in the process at
dispute in Grutter. Law school is a popular professional
degree to pursue for African-American and Hispanic104 college
graduates, as popular for them as it is for whites. Nonetheless, despite affirmative action, a smaller proportion of
African-American and Hispanic who apply to law school are
accepted. African-Americans and Hispanics constitute
roughly 20 percent of the applicant pool to105 law schools but
only 14 percent of those who are admitted. This lower rate
of acceptance is due almost entirely to minority students'
somewhat lower mean undergraduate grades and much
lower mean LSAT scores. 106 It is their lower performance on
the LSAT that has fueled much of the efforts to measure
qualities important to success as a lawyer in addition to the
few tested for by the LSAT.
I want to devote the rest of my time to what happens
after admission to law school. Because public attention has
been so focused on the admissions decision, it is easy to
forget that three additional critical hurdles must be surmounted before students admitted to law school become
practicing lawyers. They must graduate from law school.
They must pass a bar examination. And they must find a
job. I see some anxious faces in the audience. I sympathize.
Here is some information about these hurdles.
First, of those who start law school, how many actually
finish? In the nation's law schools as a whole, of students
who started law school in the year 1998, 91 percent of white
students were still there at the beginning of their third
year, in comparison with 86 percent of Hispanics and 79
percent of African-Americans. Over twice as high a proportion of African-Americans as whites had left law school. 107
The final percentages at graduation were closely similar.
After finishing law school, the next challenge is passing
the bar examination. Unfortunately, the only information
systematically gathered by race for the nation as a whole is
for the class that entered law school in 1991. Here again,
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 13.
at 18 tbl.13.
at 16-18.
at 7 tbl.18.
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African-American and Hispanic students had comparatively
difficult experiences. Among those who took the bar examination at least once, 97 percent of whites eventually pass,
in comparison with 78
percent of African-Americans and 88
percent of Hispanics. 108
If we put these two stages together-law school graduation and bar passage-and ask among all those who start
law school what proportion eventually both graduate and
pass a bar, the figures for minority students are particularly discouraging. Using the 1991 class figures, 83 percent
of whites who started law school both graduated and passed
the bar, in comparison to 71 percent of Hispanics and 57
percent of African-Americans. We worry a great deal about
getting African-American students into law school, but fail
to recognize that more than two of every five AfricanAmericans who begin law school never pass a bar.
Finally the last hurdle is finding a job as a lawyer.
Many law school graduates, regardless of race, have a difficult time finding full-time employment as a lawyer. Reliable information by race is unavailable, but the data we do
have suggests that minority students may have even more
difficulties than white. Part of this difficulty may be due to
old-fashioned discrimination, but it is also due to the grades
that minority students earn in law school. Grades count
more heavily in the legal profession for first jobs than in
any other profession and, on average at most law schools109
minority students earn lower grades than white students.
Minority students also carry with them onto the job market
less social capital than whites-for example, fewer of them
have a parent or other close relative who is already a lawyer.
If one adds difficulties in finding employment to their
graduation and bar passage difficulties, it may well be that
half the African-American students who start law school
~nd up in the full-time practice of law. How regrettable that
18.

One point to be drawn from this information about the
events after admission to law school is obvious: law schools
need to continue to reconsider the criteria taken into ac108. LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE
STUDY (LSAC 1998), available at http://www.lsacnet.org/lsadresearch-reports/
NLBPS.pdf.
109. Id.
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count in admissions, but they need to give at least as much
effort to improving minority student performance at the
three later points in the pipeline. At least on their face,
these later moments-graduation, bar passage, and job
attainment-ought to be more susceptible to law school
interventions than the earlier and more daunting problems
of high school and college completion. As to graduation from
law school, for example, minority students encounter
greater problems than whites not only with regard to
academic performance but also with finances and social
comfort. Not nearly enough research has been undertaken
to learn what could be done to increase graduation rates.
I worry that our success in Grutter is going to make law
schools complacent. The Supreme Court has given us permission to continue the admissions procedures we have
developed over the past three decades. Because of it, we
may devote too little attention to improving minority
success at the stages before and after admission.
I want to end, however, on a more optimistic note. It is
simply that when minority law students make it over all
the hurdles I've discussed and enter into the practice of law,
they typically have satisfying and valuable careers. Two
other colleagues at Michigan and I have conducted a 110
study
of all of Michigan's minority and white graduates. We
found that minority graduates were in all areas of practice,
and that they more frequently than whites took public
service jobs in government. Those in government earned
substantial incomes and commonly rose to positions of significant responsibility. Those in private practice earned
very high incomes. They provided a great deal of service to
minority clients. Our black graduates in private practice,
for example, much more frequently served black clients
than our white graduates did. Thus, they are providing
valuable services to previously underserved groups. Finally,
our minority private practitioners, to a greater extent than
our white practitioners, provided public service in the form
of pro bono legal work and service on the boards of nonprofit organizations.
At the end of her opinion in Grutter, Justice O'Connor
expresses the expectation that in twenty-five years there

110. Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice:
The River Runs Through the Law School, 25 LAW AND Soc. INQUIRY 395 (2000).
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will be no more need for affirmative action. m Very little in
current trends suggests that she is correct. This country
has many reasons to want to ensure the substantial representation of minority lawyers in the legal profession over
the century to come. Sad to say, we have a great deal more
work to do to make certain that it happens.
Thank you.
QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION

Athena D. Mutua
One member of the audience has submitted a question
asking to what extent an affirmative action program should
account for social class, considering that many under-represented groups are over-represented in the lower class.

Charles E. Daye
There have been instances of schools experimenting in
trying to use class instead of race. 112 It turned out that
economic bases for affirmative action would not work for
racial minorities who were greatly out-numbered by whites
who were also poor. But there appears to have been even a
perverse dimension in the sense that African-Americans or
minorities in the economic upper class were treated like
whites in the economic upper class. Consequently, if you
take low economic status (class) as an independent factor
worth some plus consideration, you exclude the betterqualified minorities from consideration in favor of both less
qualified minorities and less qualified whites. So class was
confounding in that way. That does not mean class ought
not be its own variable. At the University of North Carolina, where I am, we speak about giving opportunities to
111. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310.
112. See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997); Deborah C. Malamud,
Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939
(1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic
Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1913, 1947-52 (1996) (discussing limits of
effectiveness of economically-based programs and reporting on studies at California schools); Suzanne E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: Where
Do Universities Go From Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 21 (2004).

2004]

WHO GETS IN?

577

kids from the coastal hamlets of Eastern North Carolina
and from the hollows of the mountains of Western North
Carolina. We try to take seriously that we are engaged in
social uplift by getting those students into the legal profession. So, I think class is its own variable, but it is
confounded when it is used as a surrogate or as a proxy for
race.

FrankH. Wu
I want to make a similar point, which is that no matter
how robust your measure for class is you almost certainly
end up benefiting predominantly poor people who are white.
Now that is not a bad thing, but it means that to the extent
that you address issues of race, it is only as a side consequence. If you want to address problems of race, the most
direct way is to address problems of race, not to address
problems of class and hope incidentally to produce a racial
benefit.

David L. Chambers
Charles Daye said that one of the effects of considering
class but not race would be that some of the best qualified
minority students who have upper- or upper-middle class
backgrounds would not then get into law school. Some
people hear that and say, "Well, that's exactly right." They
would say, "The upper-class black kid has had all the
privileges. Why should he or she get extra consideration in
the admissions process?" Well, here is why. First, their life
experience still has been quite different. That they were
born black has not been irreverent to their lives; and thus,
their sensibilities, their experiences of race in this country
add something distinctive to the student body. Second, at
least our own studies at Michigan suggest that black
persons of upper class or upper-middle class backgrounds
still provide more service to black clients not necessarily of
the upper classes after they graduate. They are also more
likely than white graduates to involve themselves in the
black community and in black neighborhoods in their pro
bono work. We would lose something very important if we
tried somehow to substitute class for race in our evaluations.
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Athena D. Mutua
Here is another question from the audience for the
entire panel. What lessons can be learned from how law
schools have dealt with gender discrimination in admissions that might be helpful in dealing with racial
disparities?

Charles E. Daye
You did not have to deal with it. Once you stopped discriminating against women, they took over the place!
[laughter] National data on women show that nearly 50
percent of last fall's entering first-year class was women. 113

David L. Chambers
And among black students, particularly, women outnumber men by almost two to one.

Athena D. Mutua
This question asks about the desirability of using a
diversity definition that matches the percentage profile of a
particular state in terms of African-Americans, Hispanics,
Native Americans, Asians, and other ethnic groups.

Margaret E. Montoya
Well, I think that data inform decisions that you might
take, but I certainly hope that nothing I said suggested that
what we are trying to do is to match those percentages. I
think they are relevant, because they give all of us a backdrop or a context against which these decisions are being
made. As it happens, in the southwest these numbers are
changing very rapidly because of increases in immigration.
I think that we need to keep these numbers in front of us,
but we don't use them as goals or targets or anything else.
113. ABA data for Fall 2003 show that women comprised 47.8 percent of the
incoming class and 48. 7 percent of total J.D. enrollment. See Memorandum
from David Rosenlieb, Data Specialist, Section of Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar, to Deans of AHA-approved Law Schools, Fall 2003
Enrollment Statistics (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/statistics/enrollment2003statistics. pdf.
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David L. Chambers
The Supreme Court is permitting law schools to take
race and ethnicity into account in admissions, but it has not
said that we must take into account any particular racial
and ethnic groups. A law school in a state with a large
Mexican-American population might permissibly place
nearly its entire diversity focus on Mexican-American
students, could it not?

Charles E. Daye
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has a statement in her
opinion in which
she lauds Michigan for not being focused
solely on race. 114

FrankH. Wu
The trouble is that she does treat it that way. Although
I also applaud what the school did, it gives me pause that
one of the arguments the school presented was that even
whites could benefit if there were some issue that required
that we consider whiteness as a plus factor. Now, it is
understandable that they would make that argument, that
they would concede that, but it just shows that the concept
of diversity has been entirely abstracted.

Charles E. Daye
Another thing that is very clear is that, if you have an
avowed proportional representation program, it would be
struck down summarily. The quota issue is foreclosed. It is
not even clear to me the extent to which you can say that,
in light of the proportion of our population that is Hispanic
or whatever, we have a goal of some particular fixed number or percentage. I think a "hard" goal is really going to
put you in a very tough, if not impossible, place to defend.
The court was very clear about this. Justice O'Connor said,
"Moreover, ... between 1993 and 2000, the number of Afri114. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 ("What is more, the Law School actually gives
substantial weight to diversity factors besides race. The Law School frequently
accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are
rejected.").
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can-American, Latino, and Native-American students in
each class at the [Michigan] Law School varied from
13.5 to
20.1 percent, a range inconsistent with a quota."115

Margaret E. Montoya
I just wanted to comment on the amicus brief that was
submitted by the service academies in Grutter. If there was
any affirmative action program that was aggressive and
that had aspects of proportionality, it was what the service
academies were doing. They were definitely looking to see
what were the percentages of African-Americans and
Chicanos as a percentage of the total population. It will be
interesting to see what they will do post-Grutter, but preGrutter they were certainly doing things that I would never
have advised any law school to do.

Athena D. Mutua
Professor Wu, I wonder if you could comment further
about historically black colleges and the issue of diversity?
The argument has been made that diversity serves a different purpose when African-Americans or other minorities
are brought into a predominantly white environment, as
contrasted with historically black colleges where considerations of diversity have quite different meanings.

FrankH. Wu
If you are going to be upwardly mobile, if you want to be
successful, if you want to be a lawyer in a Wall Street firm
or on K Street in Washington, D.C., or in the Loop in Chicago, you need to know how to behave like a white person.
That is, you need to know what fork to pick up. You need to
recognize the appropriate attire to wear on the tennis court.
You need to know what food to eat and how to eat it. You
need to know how to pronounce words, how to enunciate,
how to "pass" on the telephone. If you are a person of color,
you have to know how to do that. But no one has to learn
how to be black. Unless you want to go out of your way to
make a point, you do not have to assimilate that way.

115. Id. at 336.
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There is an interesting function that predominantly
black institutions play. Sometimes people think, oh, in
Howard you must talk about race all the time, right? Actually, no, because in a funny way race simply drops out. If in
my first year Civil Procedure class I do not call on someone
who is a black male and I instead call on the next person,
when I was teaching at Michigan that black male might
have thought-and perfectly reasonably-"Gee, I wonder
why Wu didn't call on me when my hand was up. Maybe it's
prejudice." But you know what? In a funny way at Howard
that vanishes, because the very next person sitting there,
the one you do call on, is also a black male. So the person
knows that whatever else is going on, it is not racial prejudice. And suddenly it is comforting to be in the norm, to be
in the mainstream, to not have to worry about people not
recognizing certain baseline experiences that are an important part of your culture.
One of the reasons we might be troubled about diversity
is because we do not really answer the question of "diversity
for what purpose and for whom?" And it may very well be
that we simply are using people to do a little song and
dance, you know, ''You have to be a representative. You
have to provide a flavor that otherwise would not be there."

Charles E. Daye
This is one of the things my colleagues and I have spent
quite some time considering in connection with our research
project. Can we tease out the different dimensions along
which race might matter? We start with a baseline of the
social science data in the Grutter case, which established
that minority students who feel isolated and alone do not
generate the kind of discussions that they might otherwise
participate in if they did not feel so isolated and alone. 116
You have to have enough minority students so that the
116. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318-19. This is the "critical mass" discussion.
Justice O'Connor discusses the evidence submitted on the Michigan Law
School's efforts to assure that a critical mass of each student group was present.
She referred to testimony that "indicated that critical mass means numbers
such that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like
spokespersons for their race" and "that when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because
nonminority students learn there is no "'minority viewpoint,'" but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students. Id. at 319.
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student who is called on can realize that the professor is not
playing some game, because there was more than one black
male in his class and he did not call on any of them that day
or he called on some other one that day.
But the larger question is, why would racial diversity
matter? It may matter in a lot of ways. Does it matter
because race influences the kinds of experiences a person
will have in society that will help form how the person
interprets events and stimuli? Does it matter in the kinds of
student organizations that are offered and present on
campus? Does it matter in the ways students interact with
each other in study groups? Does it matter in the kinds of
speakers students bring to the campus? Does it matter in
the discussions outside the classrooms and around the
hallways? We have a free speech board at our law school.
The discussions on the free speech board are probably different because there are diverse students than they would
be if we had all black students or all white students. And
surely they are different than if we had some tiny number
of minority students in a predominantly white school,
because they probably would not put anything up there.
But we do not really know these things for sure. We do
not really know, and this is what we are going to try to
tease out in our study: how does racial diversity matter?
Justice O'Connor referred to the benefits of educational
diversity, but we do not quite know what those benefits are
or how diversity matters. We think there will be individuals
who will matriculate in institutions and learn about and
from each other. We hypothesize that students who benefit
from diversity will be better able to go out into the diverse
world and be more effective because they have had a
diverse educational background and experience in law
school. But we do not know yet that empirical analysis will
confirm that hypothesis. In a few years, we hope that we
will know whether the hypothesis is correct.

Athena D. Mutua
I have several questions from the audience that ask,
how do we know when we have achieved the goal of equality, or how do we know when diversity is achieved?
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FrankH. Wu
Part of what has happened is that we seem to think
that diversity is just an outcome. I would like to suggest
that it is a process. And when people say, "Well, when does
it end?" my answer is, "Never." When people say that I am
just a cynic or a pessimist or whatever, I say that they are
wrong. Diversity is like democracy itself. We do not want
democracy to end. We want people to participate in it, and
we want an ever-increasing number of people to do so.
When you vote this fall and you are standing in line, imagine if the person in front of you says, "I'm sick and tired of
this. We just voted two years ago. Why are we doing it
again?" This person missed an important civics class. He
does not get it. I would suggest that the same thing is true
for issues of diversity, and these are perennial issues.
Diversity is a process, not an outcome. So it does not make
any sense to ask when does it end. When does what end? It
is always with us. It is one of the welcome challenges that a
civic culture presents.

David L. Chambers
That is sometimes the way people ask the question. But
sometimes when people ask that question, they are really
asking a different question. They are really asking, "When
can affirmative action end?" That is, when can we stop
taking race explicitly into account in the admissions process
rather than just relying on whatever other criteria for
admission we otherwise use and know that, as with gender,
it will produce a diverse class. The answer to this question
is, because we will always want racial diversity in our
schools, we will take race into account until all the obstacles
have been deal with that suppress the numbers of minority
students who would get in without consideration of race. I
do not think we can say how many years that will be. Over
the last few years, I have spent a lot of time in South Africa,
and I am stunned that there are white people there who
worked to end Apartheid but who say, ''Yes, we absolutely
have to have affirmative action, but just for one generation." They believe that the playing field will be level in
twenty years or so. That isn't going to happen there, just as
it hasn't happened here. The effects of slavery, discrimination and stigma are much more enduring.
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Charles E. Daye
I think we are really talking about how we will achieve
social justice, and I do not know if we even have a model so
we can say that "we will know it when we see it." We think
we know what it might look like, but it is so complicated
that we are not able to identify even the things that contribute to the lack of advantages that we have. For
example, we are learning now that a mother's prenatal diet
affects the development of the fetal brain in utero. We are
learning more about the ''hard wiring" of the brain and the
connection between the mother's diet, her stress level while
she is carrying the baby, and other factors that would affect
the baby's likelihood of passing some test or getting a good
score on an LSAT many years later. I think medical science
will probably be working at such matters as this for a while.
We would like to achieve a point at which who a person's
parents are does not delimit the goals that the person can
set for herself or himself. But we do not even know yet what
all goes into that. We know that it is complicated. We know
that we have not come close to achieving anything like the
day when the circumstances of a child's birth will not have
an adverse influence on that child's ability to achieve in life.
So, I think we will not accomplish this in my lifetime, and I
am not that old.

Athena D. Mutua
A member of the audience asks what law schools can do
to address the disparate graduation rates and bar passage
rates of African-American and Latino/Latina students.

David L. Chambers
I came to you with numbers about lower graduation and
bar passage rates for minority students. In terms of the
formal study of it, a major question that people would like
to answer is whether extra counseling and tutoring helps
during law school. It turns out that this is a difficult question to research. Not surprisingly, the students that have
had tutoring were more likely to flunk out than the
students that did not have tutoring. Of course, the only
people that get tutoring are the students who are already in
trouble. So we have not been successful so far in teasing out
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how much difference it makes to provide tutoring or extra
programming or some additional instruction before the first
year oflaw school. So far as I know, it has not been done.

Athena D. Mutua
This question asks Professor Chambers whether Professor Montoya's report actually contradicted what you
thought law schools and law students could do with regard
to the educational "pipeline" issues that both of you
discussed.

David L. Chambers
The question is, what can law students do to improve
the educational process starting in elementary education,
either to help improve the curricula or to inspire children
who are in elementary school to start thinking big about
their promise in their life? My only claim would be that
there are only 180 law schools. Even if every law school in
the country could adopt a school, and even if the law students could volunteer in that school like crazy, we would
still touch only 1 percent or less than 1 percent of the
schools. I am afraid that even at the volunteer level writ
large, there is just very little that the law schools can
achieve. But perhaps I am a cynic, and you should listen to
Margaret Montoya and pay no attention to me.

Margaret E. Montoya
Let me reemphasize that the context that I am talking
about is New Mexico. I do not know whether the model that
I am proposing to you works outside of that context. But I
do know that I can take a seminar, and I can say to the
students in that seminar, "I want you to develop projects
that are going to have public policy implications beyond this
semester." What I mean by that is that I want you to identify the agency heads that are really overseeing these
problems and talk with the legislators who have some
interest in these problems and see the staffers for the governor. I know this is going to happen, because our law
school has those contacts. It is a small state, and policy
makers are interested in what law students can do for
them. We have a track record of having done this in the
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past, not only me but any number of my colleagues. So
when I set out to give the students a public policy and law
project, not only do I have every confidence in their initiative and creativity, but also I know that law students in
New Mexico can do a lot. Next month we will have a
national conference in which we will bring in someone from
the Department of Justice, and we will talk about segregation. We will have the superintendents, school board members and principals there. This is not abstract. It is going to
happen.

David L. Chambers
But you are talking about something very different. I
was talking about going into the schools.

Margaret E. Montoya
We have begun to move in that direction as well, and I
think we have achieved some traction. Although the number of law students may be small, they have the advantage
of working in connection with a large and highly effective
Hispanic retention program in New Mexico. So there is
often already a system for my students to become involved
with mostly Latino and Latina students. They do not have
to invent the pathways to become involved. Those pathways
are there, and they can improve on them. Now, I happen to
think this is a model that may have applicability outside of
New Mexico, but I know it works in New Mexico.

Athena D. Mutua
Are there any other concluding comments?

FrankH. Wu
I have just one very simple point: this is all real, and it
is not just a matter of abstractions or phrases like "strict
scrutiny." This determines who will sit on the bench, who
will appear in courtrooms as attorneys and as defendants.
We should always ask, what are the consequences? What do
the empirical data show? What will happen if we adopt this
program or that program? And the last thought I had was
simply one word: vote.
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David L. Chambers
I want to say that while we at Michigan are delighted
with the outcome in Grutter, many of us are unhappy that
the rationale for considering race in admissions remains
primarily focused on diversity within the educational institution. For the first time, the Court in Grutter suggests that
diversity in the bar in general may be an important social
value. I hope we can build on this language. But I also wish
that the Court had gone beyond and talked about the need
to share the American pie more broadly and the need for a
broader vision of social justice. As you think about the
issues of affirmative action and the importance of having
minority students in our schools, I hope that your own
thinking will not be confined by the narrow vision that our
courts have adopted.
AFTERWORD: SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS AND COMMENTS

Athena D. Mutua
The panel presentations provoked a lively discussion,
yet the large number of speakers and the time set aside for
questions meant that both the presentations and discussion
were short. I now turn to a few of the issues that undoubtedly would have emerged if time had permitted.
The presentations and the ensuing discussion raised a
host of issues for further contemplation and study. I will
take up three of those issues in my brief comments here.
My first set of comments entails my belief that Professors
Zedeck and Shultz's study has implications for the wider
legal educational and professional community as it relates
to the law school experience and entry to the profession via
the bar. The study raises questions and invites inquiry into
the efficacy of the law school experience to effective lawyering, the relationship of the bar to the effective practice of
law, and the impact that both may play in narrowing the
diversity of prospective lawyers. My second set of comments
take up the social justice question as posed by Professor
Wu: "Diversity for what purposes and for whom?" And finally, my last comment addresses the issue of cultural
difference or cultural race as a basis of diversity.
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A. Effective Lawyering and Diversity: What do Law School
and the Bar Examination have to do with it?

Professors Zedeck and Shultz's empirical work, which
identifies twenty-six factors that contribute to effective
lawyering and which will be used as a basis for developing a
test to assess these traits and abilities, is important for
several reasons. First, it takes up the challenge posed by
Justice O'Connor to law schools to develop race-neutral
admission policies that yield diverse student bodies. 117
Second, it will potentially yield students who are better
suited to the successful study and practice of law while
potentially rendering more diverse student bodies. In this
sense these assessment tools may marry merit and diversity in the context of a debate that erroneously has seen
these two goals as incompatible. Third, it explicitly recognizes the limitations of law school reliance on LSAT and
GPA scores for selecting law students, as these scores
assess only one type of ability and, by the test-makers' own
admission, merely predict how well an applicant will
perform as a first year law student. These scores have even
less predictive value on the question of whether a student
will pass the bar. And they may say nothing at all about
whether a student will become an effective lawyer. 118
Finally, in doing all of the above, the Zedeck-Shultz study
de-mystifies notions of merit by exposing the fact that definitions of merit are socially constructed, rather than
divinely given. In other words, people make tests, and
whether one is "qualified" rests on whether one can meet
some sort of preconceived or predetermined notion of what
is necessary in a particular job category.
The study and the potential development of new assessment tools also raise a number of questions. One
question is: Why might such a test potentially cull a more
diverse student body? It seems that part of the answer is
that the potential test is intended to do so in the sense that
it is being designed in the context of a more diverse legal
profession and is not meant to exclude some particular
racial or ethnic group. In this way it differs from the LSAT
test, which was initially designed with the intent to exclude
southern and eastern Europeans and was first crafted dur117. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-43.
118. See discussion supra pp. 542-50.

2004]

WHO GETS IN?

589

ing a time when African, Latino, and Native Americans
were for the most part excluded from entry into the legal
•
119
pro1ess10n.
Other questions are not so easily answered. For
instance, one student attending the Mitchell Lecture asked,
might the kind of test that Professor Zedeck is developing
weed out potential students who could "grow" into good and
effective lawyers through the law school experience? Does
the test weed out students who may have a passion for law
but do not seem particularly well suited to be "successful"
as determined by the test? In asking, "Who gets in?," is
there room for life choice, not just talent?
A third question involves Professor Chambers' observation that minority graduates of Michigan go on to have successful law careers, and are presumably "effective lawyers,"
but that they often do less well in law school than white
students and have more trouble passing the bar. Given
these facts, what is the relationship between the law school
experience and effective lawyering, on the one hand, and
the bar examination and effective lawyering, on the other?
Put another way, the LSAT has some predictive value
in regard to success in the first year of law school and the
bar examination. The courses that are taught nationwide in
the first year of law school are the courses that constitute
the first one-third of all student grades (which
often determine who serves on the school's law review), 120 and are also
the courses tested on the bar examination's multistate
section. If the LSAT assesses abilities which alone do not
make for an effective lawyer, then the first year law school
experience, and more importantly the bar examination may
have a similar failing-that is, they may not adequately
either prepare students for or assess their potential to be
effective lawyers. Without engaging in a full analysis of
~

119. See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias
and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV 1449, 1475-94 (discussing the formulation of merit
standards and the history of the development of the LSAT during hostilities
toward the increasing immigration of Eastern and Southern Europeans and exclusion of black people. She suggests these developments arose in part to preserve entry to the legal profession to the then-considered white elites.).
120. Professor Chambers notes in his presentation that employers tend to
focus on students' grades in their hiring decisions particularly for students who
have recently graduated. See discussion supra pp. 574-75. Serving on law review also tends to open up opportunities. Thus, first year of law school often
plays a significant role in the types of first jobs students' can secure.
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these ideas, they might suggest, at a minimum, that law
schools review and reevaluate the package of skills and
content they teach (as well as instructional methods), and
that the legal profession review the efficacy of the bar
examination, in light of Professor Zedeck's stage one
research identifying the traits and abilities that shape
effective lawyers. Otherwise, although the test Professor
Zedeck develops may redefine merit in a way that more
adequately corresponds to effective lawyering and yields
greater student diversity, these skills may or may not be
reflected, developed or evaluated through current law
school curricula, or reflected in and tested on the bar. The
result may be that even though a diverse group of students
gain admission into law schools, current practices within
law schools and bar examinations may nonetheless lag
behind and narrow the diversity of prospective lawyers or
job opportunities for these lawyers because of lower grades
in first year courses and lower bar passage rates of minorities.
B. "Diversity for what purpose and for whom?"

Even as this Zedeck-Shultz study prompts us to think
more seriously about diversity in admissions and the relationship of admission standards to the study and effective
practice of law, it does not attempt to address the problems
of the pipeline. These problems include the fact that some
minorities may be less prepared than similarly situated
whites to apply to law school and the fact that pipeline
problems result in a small pool of minority law school applicants, as discussed by Professor Montoya. Her comments
make it clear that those minorities who get to the law
school admission stage are a mere fraction of those who
start out in our K-12 educational system, where minorities
experience very high drop-out rates and inferior schooling.
She asks us to get involved in changing this problem.
And we should, in recognition that these problems are
grounded in much larger social structures and forces,
including segregated housing, the linchpin of a segregated
and unequal educational system, and poverty, among others, 121 many of which build upon and reflect historical
121. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior, 81
L. REV. 1441, 1444 (noting that the "structural linchpin" of U.S. racial
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discrimination, oppression and exclusion. These forces no
longer rely upon designations of race to keep racial groul?s22
segregated, impoverished, oppressed and in their place,
blacks in ghettos across the tracks, Indians on the reservations. Rather, with
the failure and abandonment of integration as a policy, 123 these structures continue to be a part of
the social construction of inequality that constitutes race,
building on old patterns and forms of past racism resulting
in new forms of colorblind racism. 124 In fact, as we prepare
to celebrate fifty years of Brown, "man~ children still attend
racially segregated unequal schools," 25 a realization that
takes us back to diversity as a tool of social justice, or to the
question Professor Wu poses: Diversity for what purposes
and for whom?
While Professor Wu applauds the Supreme Court's
decision in Grutter, as do many of us, he does so primarily,
it seems, because of the effect of the decision. The effect of
the decision is that qualified minority students will continue to gain admission in law schools in sizable numbers
and perhaps be in positions later to wrestle social justice
from a society that appears unwilling to address the past,
current, or future injustices created by prior and emerging
forms of racism. But the question itself invites a more disturbing one, one posed long ago by Professor Derrick Bell,
when, in analyzing Brown, he suggested that the U.S.
decision to break with its segregationist past in Brown
inequality is residential segregation, citing MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
INEQUALITY (1995) (discussing housing as lynchpin of segregation.)). See also
Greg Toppo, Integrated Schools Still a Dream 50 Years Later; Decades After
Brown, Income, Not the Law, Separates the Races, USA TODAY, April 28, 2004,
at Al (discussing the legacy of the Brown v. Board of Education decision and
noting that while black and white students are no longer segregated by law
they are segregated by where they live).
122. See Toppo, supra note 121 at A2.
123. See id. (mentioning that many communities and the policy of"Leave No
Child Left Behind" abandon or retreat from integration).
124. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK SEXUAL POLITICS: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, GENDER, & THE NEW RACISM 53-85 (2004) (explaining that a new
racism exists that draws upon past and sedimented patterns of old racial
formations (slavery, segregation, etc.), but which is reorganized in response to
globalization, transnationalism, and the proliferation of a mass media that recognizes and recycles old stereotypes of Black people). Collins notes that this
new racism is "seemingly colorblind," id. at 85, and comments that colorblind
ideology is part of the new racism, id. at 178.
125. Toppo, supra note 121, at A2 (emphasis added).
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could not be understood without considering its value to
whites. Its value to whites included its potential for solidifying U.S. credibility in the minds of third world peoples,
whose support the U.S. sought in its anticommunist struggle.126 The question, posed more strongly, is: Can minorities
ever receive
any measure of justice except as a tool of white
interests? 121
The answer, as Professor Daye points out, seems to
be-not really, not according to the Supreme Court in the
higher education context. The race of disadvantaged
minorities cannot be taken into account as part of a process
of eliminating the effects of past and present oppression
(unless intentional discrimination is found). Rather, it can
be considered only in the university setting where minorities contribute to a diverse educational environment (for
whites?),
in order to augment a "robust exchange of
ideas;"128 where the presence of minorities is needed to teach
and demonstrate to white students that there is "no minority viewpoint;" 129 or in the legal profession, where their
presence may be needed to "visibly" lend legitimacy to a
system and a set of leaders by signifying that the path to
leadership is "open to talented
and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity."130 The latter is so even though
this system of leadership, often trained in law, is likely to
remain overwhelmingly white given the predominance of
white students in law schools, and in elite law schools
particularly. Therefore, might diversity in admissions primarily serve whites by legitimating what can be argued to
be an illegitimate system?

126. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 20 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
127. Id. at 22 (stating that "the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.
However, the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a
judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy
sought threatens the superior societal status of middle- and upper-class
whites.").
128. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
129. Id. at 320 (quoting a witness for Michigan Law School).
130. Id. at 332 (mentioning the role of law schools in training many of the
nation's leaders). See also COLLINS, supra note 124, at 178 (explaining that the
colorblind ideology of the new racism requires that Blackness be seen, as
evidence that policies of colorblindness are working).
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Further, given the overwhelming predominance of
whites in law schools, particularly elite law schools, are not
the terms "disfavored group" or "innocent" to describe white
students vis-a-vis minority students as used in the Grutter
decision perverse? 131 Referring to whites as a "disfavored
group" is a good example of the way in which legal langua~e
and analysis sometimes has little relation to social reality. 32
Here the legal concept of a "disfavored group" actually distorts and obscures the social reality of white privilege
and
non-white disadvantage, and perhaps is meant to. 133 This is
so, even though it is true that when schools' take race into
account as a factor for admissions, they are factoring in the
race of racial minorities and not the race of whites. This is
because whites form the overwhelming majority of the
student population, not because whites students or whiteness is disfavored.
Similarly, the Court's use of the term
"innocent" 134 to refer to those who are largely the beneficiaries of white privilege and non-white subordination in
relation to non-whites who overwhelmingly bear the disadvantages of the history of white domination is simply
scandalous. When a white student laughs and says, "I
shouldn't have to suffer for my father's sins," I usually
smile and reply, "My children shouldn't have to suffer for
your father's sins, either." A social tax levied in favor of
those who have been socially disadvantaged seems a small
131. Justice O'Connor, in writing on behalf of the majority in Grutter, rarely
uses the term "disfavored group" in reference to white students. She does so
only when quoting someone else. The term, however, is widely used in Justice
Thomas's dissent. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Colorblind", in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 257,
262-68 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (making a similar point in which
legal analysis, particularly use of "formal race" by the Supreme Court, is disconnected from and thus does not reflect social reality). Gotanda suggests the
various meanings of the term race in Supreme Court jurisprudence, explaining
that they cover four distinct ideas: status race, formal race, historical race, and
cultural race. Id. at 257-58.
133. See, e.g., PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A
PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN
WOMEN'S STUDIES (Wellesley Center for Research on Women, Working Paper
No. 189, 1998); CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) (discussing the notion of white privilege).
134. Under strict scrutiny analysis the state must not only show a that a racial classification is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest but
must also show that the racial classification does not unduly harm innocent
third parties. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27.
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price to pay in the context of expanding law school opportunities.135 Yet the Supreme Court seems unwilling to do anything about the disadvantages heaped on these innocents
for this group's own sake.
Moreover, although Justice Thomas' opinion would do
little, if anything, to address the justice claims of minorities, might he be on to something when he suggests that
diversity advocates in law school settings are simply trying
to construct or preserve a certain aesthetic, one in which
different types of bodies are represented? Might it be that
all white leadership, all white schools, pictures of all white
classrooms in the context of a diverse America, make us
aesthetically uncomfortable-but merely uncomfortable?
Might this be so despite the fact that large segments of
white American society apparently prefer all white settings
given the failure of integration? If so, might the decision for
diversity in higher education settings, in the absence of
other mechanisms to address societal discrimination and
oppression, satisfy this aesthetic discomfort, yet contribute
little to social justice and perhaps dampen any thirst for it?

C. Cultural Race as a Basis for Diversity?
And finally, when Professor Daye, in describing some of
the motivation for his empirical study, posits that his "life
would have been different had he been white," is he simply
suggesting that absent social inequality, his life would have
been different or is he suggesting that race means something more? On the other hand, Justice O'Connor seems to
understand race as simply social inequality when she notes
that race "unfortunately still matters," and hopes that in
twenty-five years it no longer will. Is not race more complicated than this?
Professor Neil Gotanda, in critiquing the notion of a
colorblind constitution, suggests that the term race has four
135. I first heard Randall Kennedy suggest that affirmative action could be
seen as a form of a social tax on those who are the beneficiaries of social injustice in favor of those who are members of groups who suffer social disadvantage.
Further it seems to me that minorities are not immune from this kind of social
tax. So, for example, all non-Native Americans could be considered beneficiaries
of policies that resulted in the seizure of Native American land. All of us, therefore, should be subject to a social tax that runs in favor of Native Americans, a
community that given our notions of private property should be some of the
richest communities in the country instead of some of the poorest.
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different meanings in judicial decisions. 136 Most of these
meanings relate to the idea that the construction of race
has been the construction of social and structural inequaliti
through reference to different types of human bodies. 1 7
However, this construction of race has been wrought on
peoples who have continued to live and produce culture in
reaction to and despite oppression. These cultures, what
Neil Gotanda calls "cultural race," include the songs, music,
spiritual traditions, languages, and stories, among other
things, of these subordinated groups. 138
Often these are the things we pass down to our children-ways of being that reach back before colonial experience or constructed
within the depths of oppression but
often in spite of it. 139 And while many minorities wish for a
time in which social inequality as aspects of race would be
no more, might we want to hold onto the cultural aspects of
differences produced in part by race-ways of being, thinking, and living shaped by historical oppression? These
cultural representations-rituals and stories-are often not
the typical stories about hard work and assimilation into
the prevailing social order, including the racial hierarchy. 140
But rather, these are rituals about hard work without benefits, land stolen, languages suppressed and demonized,
oppression enshrined in institutions and practice, and the
struggles to overcome these; struggles rendering justice not
just for one group but for many? Might Justice O'Connor
want to consider these aspects of race? And might these
cultural manifestations, not of future social inequality but
of noble deeds meant to engender and inspire a noble spirit,

136. Gotanda, supra note 132, at 257-58.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 269-72 (defining cultural race as "the customs, beliefs, and
intellectual and artistic traditions of black America as well as institutions such
as black churches and colleges." This definition might also apply to the various
Native American and Latina/o cultures.).
139. Here I am thinking of John Calmore's description of Archie Shepp's
music as authentic and self-referential black music. See John Calmore, Critical
Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual
Life in a Multicultural World, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 315 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
140. See, e.g., Ronald Takaki, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF
MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 139-65, 277-310 (1993) (discussing how the Irish and
Jews, respectively, became white. Takaki suggests that theirs was a course of
assimilation).
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offer some of the diversity of thought that she might want
to keep in the classroom in twenty-five years?
CONCLUSION

The 2004 Mitchell Lecture raises a host of issues. In
discussing only three of these, I suggest first that the
Zedeck-Shultz project and the issues Professor Chambers
describes raise larger questions about the efficacy of the law
school experience and bar examination to effective lawyering and to diversity within the profession as a whole.
Second, I suggest, drawing on Professors Montoya's and
Wu's work, that the concept of diversity be used not simply
as a tool for educating primarily whites but that it also be
used as a tool for eliminating the societal discrimination
suffered by minorities due to the effects of past and emerging forms of racism. Conceptualized in this way, diversity
has implications for all levels of the educational system, not
just for law school admissions. And finally, drawing upon
Professor Daye's ideas, I posit that race may be a more
complicated construction than Justice O'Connor allows, and
that aspects of race, e.g., cultural race, may provide for
some of the diversity of thought and motivation that she
considers important to the robust exchange of ideas and the
practice oflaw.
We hope the publication of these proceedings will
stimulate further questions, discussions, and contemplation.

